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UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND 
REGULATORY DESIGN 
 
Adam I. Muchmore∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article develops an analytic framework for 
understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. It 
begins by differentiating between three types of uncertainty: 
legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and uncertainty about the 
application of law to fact. This framework highlights the 
pervasiveness of factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty in 
daily affairs. Viewed through this framework, legal uncertainty 
is less problematic than it is typically thought to be. 
The Article then focuses on legal uncertainty, examining it 
from two perspectives: the relationship between rules and 
standards, and the relationship between simplicity and 
complexity. It suggests that there are fundamental limits on the 
amount of certainty in any regulatory system. These include 
limits of internal consistency, limits created by the pressure for 
justice in the individual case, and limits created by the tendency 
of additional complexity—past a certain point—to decrease, 
rather than increase, the certainty of legal requirements. 
Before concluding, the Article sets out four propositions 
about the relationship between legal uncertainty and regulatory 
design. First, pockets of legal uncertainty are often a desirable 
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characteristic of regulatory systems. Second, in any particular 
regulatory field, large swings over time between high levels of 
certainty and uncertainty are likely to be less desirable than a 
consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty. Third, arguments 
for legal certainty are rarely distributionally neutral and are 
often window dressing for what are fundamentally distributional 
arguments. Fourth, uncertainty about the content of future legal 
requirements is qualitatively different from uncertainty about 
the application of existing legal requirements. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to explore these propositions in detail. 
However, the ability to identify them suggests the value of 
having a solid analytic framework for understanding the role of 
uncertainty in regulatory design. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the relationship between legal 
uncertainty1 and regulatory design. It takes a broad 
perspective on regulation,2 using the term to include any 
combination of a monitoring regime and a system of sanctions 
or benefits for particular behaviors.3 Its focus is on the 
                                                       
 1. This Article uses the unmodified term “uncertainty” in a general sense intended 
to capture the group of ideas referred to in various literature by terms such as: 
“ambiguity,” “indeterminacy,” “vagueness,” “Knightian Risk and Uncertainty” (without 
distinguishing between the two Knightian Categories), and “fat-tailed risk.” It uses the 
more specific terms individually when intending to refer to them in their precise, 
technical sense. 
  The decision to use the term “uncertainty” to refer these concepts collectively is 
in no way intended to suggest these terms are equivalent. All have some distinct 
meanings, and the divisions are particularly sharp in certain academic fields. For 
example, economists often focus on Frank Knight’s distinction between “risk” (where 
probabilities can be quantified) and “uncertainty” (where probabilities cannot be 
quantified). See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (photo. 
reprint 1964) (1921). The Article uses the single term “uncertainty” to refer collectively to 
these ideas for two reasons. First, the use of a single term keeps sentence structures 
manageable. Second, this collective use of the term is sufficiently close to lay usage of 
“uncertainty” that it should make sense to readers from different academic fields. See 
Uncertainty, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/210212 (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2016). 
 2. To be clear, I am not offering a precise definition of “regulation” here. I am 
setting out a perspective on regulation meant to include a large number of different 
systems for controlling behavior. The exact boundaries between regulation and its 
absence are not important to this project. 
 3. This perspective is meant to include regulation targeting either behaviors or 
outcomes, and involving either government or third-party monitoring. I discuss these 
approaches to regulation in more detail in Adam I. Muchmore, Private Regulation and 
Foreign Conduct, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 377–81 (2010). A non-exhaustive list of topics 
included in this perspective on regulation are traditional command-and-control 
regulation, delegations of regulatory authority to public and private entities, 
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practical role that legal uncertainty plays in regulatory 
systems. This practical focus puts the emphasis on 
understanding the effect legal uncertainty has on primary 
behavior—the actions that subjects of regulation take before 
they know whether they will be involved in a particular, 
concrete dispute.4 
A prominent view in the opinions issued by courts,5 the 
extrajudicial writing of prominent jurists,6 the work of leading 
                                                       
outcome-based regulation, and tort law. Id. at 382–85. In other words, “regulation” in this 
Article does not refer solely (or even primarily) to formal and informal rulemaking by 
executive agencies. 
 4. This focus on primary behavior deemphasizes the role of judicial decisions in 
actual, litigated disputes. This is important because actual, litigated disputes may be 
highly unrepresentative of the broader range of legal disputes. See generally George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984); see also Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 
J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495, 498–501 (1996) (challenging a separate aspect of the 
Priest-Klein model, but praising its “general and original conclusion that cases that go to 
trial are unrepresentative of settled cases”). This Article emphasizes instead the way 
primary actors can be expected to respond—often outside of court—to situations in which 
the law is uncertain. 
 5. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 
(2001) (“That line . . . [for permitted surveillance of a home] must be not only firm but also 
bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a 
warrant.”); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 323–24 (1942) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (observing that when the Court follows bad precedents as a matter of stare 
decisis “[c]onsistency and stability may be so served” and those things are “desirable in 
themselves, for only thereby can the law be predictable to those who must shape their 
conduct by it and to lower courts which must apply it”); Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 
1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Altenbrand, C.J., concurring) (“The uncertainty of 
the current system, however, does not work.”). 
 6. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE 
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 5–6 (1962) (criticizing “the failure to 
develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions to be fairly predictable and the 
reasons for them to be understood”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18–20, 414 (2012) (asserting that proper judicial 
use of textualism would mean that “over time the law will be more certain, and the rule of 
law will then be more secure”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 
635, 644 (1989) (“Legal uncertainty is the godfather of discovery abuse. Uncertainty 
comes not only from nebulous rules in traditional subjects such as torts and contracts but 
also from attempting to handle in the courts, problems amenable to no simple solution.”); 
Antonin Scalia, The Rules of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) 
(“Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, ‘reckonability,’ is a needful characteristic of any 
law worthy of the name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at 
all.” (internal footnote omitted)); Bryan A. Garner, How Nuanced Is Justice Scalia’s 
Judicial Philosophy? An Exchange, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/107001/how-nuanced-justice-scalias-judicial-philosophy 
-exchange (“What motivated Justice Scalia and me to write this ambitious book was our 
desire to bring clarity to what has become the most muddled aspect of judicial 
decision-making: interpretation.”). 
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law-reform organizations,7 the business press,8 the academic 
world,9 and political debate10 is that legal uncertainty is a 
                                                       
 7. Two of the best known law reform organizations are the American Law Institute 
(ALI) and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). The ALI’s certificate of incorporation 
states that one of the organization’s primary goals is to “promote the clarification and 
simplification of the law.” Am. Law Inst., Certificate of Incorporation (Feb. 23, 1923), 
reprinted in 81 A.L.I. PROC. 501, 501 (2004), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public 
/10/62/106284da-ddfe-4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/certificate-of-incorporation.pdf. Likely the 
best-known work of the ULC is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC states 
that its “purposes and policies” include “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing commercial transactions.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2013). 
 8. See, e.g., The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 
22, http://www.economist.com/node/21547784 (criticizing numerous aspects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and its implementation, including discretion granted to regulators by 
complex—but still vague—statutory provisions); Jamie Whyte, Opinion, David Cameron 
vs. The Rule of Law: The Prime Minister’s Energy-Price Activism Will Lead to More Crony 
Capitalism, WALL ST. J. (Eur.) (Oct. 28, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/SB10001424052970203897404578076762840352532 (using a regulatory 
intervention on energy pricing to argue generally against government interventions in the 
economy that erode certainty in “the rules of the game”).  
 9. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 291 
(1986) (“In Bentham’s view, the greatest virtue of a rule of law (at least with respect to its 
form) is that it be public, determinate, and as a result certain and predictable in its 
application. Only under these conditions, so the argument goes, can it be said to be 
binding, because only under these conditions could it effectively guide action.”); Martha A. 
Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 684 
(1981) (“In many cases, . . . federal jurisdictional rules are extraordinarily unclear. They 
are also extremely complex. And it is not obvious what policy the complexities fulfill.”); 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 171 (2015) 
(arguing in favor of legal requirements structured as “catalogs” on the ground that these 
“do better than standards at creating a zone of certainty for actors at much lower cost 
than fully specified rules”); H.W.R. Wade, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary 
Skirmish, 4 MOD. L. REV. 183, 189 (1941) (“As law exists for security, confidence and 
freedom, it must be invested with as much certainty and uniformity as can be provided by 
the wavering structures of human institutions.”). 
  For much of his career, Friedrich von Hayek was a forceful proponent of clear, 
certain rules promulgated in advance and applied strictly. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960) (arguing that rule by “laws and not men” requires 
that “the judge who applies [laws] has no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow 
from the existing body of rules and the particular facts of the case”); F.A. HAYEK, THE 
ROAD TO SERFDOM 81 (Routledge Classics 2006) (1944) (criticizing the use of “vague 
formula[s]” such as “reference to what is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’” in legal requirements, and 
suggesting that their use, and “the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty” associated 
with their use, could be a framework for “writ[ing] a history of the decline of the Rule of 
Law”). Hayek later backed away from the position that strict application of clear rules 
was the best way to achieve legal certainty, but continued to see legal certainty as a core 
goal. See F.A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 116 
(Routledge 1998) (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY] (“It seems 
to me that judicial decisions may in fact be more predictable if the judge is also bound by 
generally held views of what is just, even when they are not supported by the letter of the 
law, than when he is restricted to deriving his decisions only from those among accepted 
beliefs which have found expression in the written law.”). 
  A focus on certainty and predictability is particularly common among those who 
write in the field of Conflict of Laws. This can be true even among those who propose 
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characteristic of poorly designed regulatory systems.11 Many 
lobbying efforts target legal uncertainty, and numerous academic 
writings propose reforms designed to reduce or eliminate 
uncertainty from particular areas of law.12 
This Article contributes to a growing literature challenging 
that view.13 This Article makes three primary contributions. 
                                                       
approaches that make the ultimate choice of law decision depend heavily on the forum in 
which the case is filed. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the 
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177–87 (1963). 
 10. See, e.g., JAN EBERLY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, IS REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY A 
MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO JOB GROWTH? (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center 
/economic-policy/Documents/Is%20Regulatory%20Uncertainty%20a%20Major%20Impedi 
ment%20to%20Job%20Growth_20111121_vFINAL.pdf (“[A] commonly repeated 
misconception[] [is] that uncertainty created by proposed regulations is holding back 
business investment in [job growth] . . . .”). 
 11. I use regulatory systems in a broad sense here, not one limited to agency 
rulemaking. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. Accordingly, statutes, treaties, 
regulations, guidance documents, and precedent (judicial and administrative) are all 
parts of regulatory systems. 
 12. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY 216 (1969) (“We must . . . find ways to minimize discretionary injustice.”); 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881) (“Legal, like natural 
divisions, however clear in their general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in 
a penumbra or debatable land. . . . Still, the tendency of the law must always be to narrow 
the field of uncertainty.”); Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A 
Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 793–94 (2013) (defending their approach to 
foreign affairs federalism on the grounds that “it has the potential to lend structure, 
predictability, and analytic rigor to an area of jurisprudence that to date has been erratic, 
unpredictable, and unprincipled”); Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to 
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1109 (2011) (“The current, piecemeal approach to 
the field has produced a rambling labyrinth of analytical bloat. The law is complex 
without subtlety, knotted without development, and often blunt without judgment.”); 
Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed 
Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 465 (1998) (“This 
Article . . . provides a single, comprehensive ‘Unitary Framework’ for analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s dormant-commerce-clause jurisprudence, making it at once more cogent 
and accessible.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 
798 (2001) (supporting argument for purposive interpretation of First Amendment in 
significant part by showing that “purposivism yields determinate results for three 
controversial First Amendment issues”). On Holmes’s complicated views on uncertainty, 
compare O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) (“And the 
logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every 
human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”), 
with Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and 
Remedies, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 432 (2011) (noting Holmes’s “long-held preoccupation 
with narrowing the range of uncertainty in tort cases”), and Wade, supra note 9, at 192–
94 (suggesting that Jerome Frank, in Law and the Modern Mind, overemphasized 
Holmes’s skeptical-of-certainty aphorisms and arguing that Holmes would “[s]urely not” 
have “condemned the lawyer’s innate hunger for an ordered and certain jurisprudence”). 
 13. See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 61–62 
(2012) (arguing that the value of legal certainty is often overstated in legal arguments 
and common-law decision-making); Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty 
Imperative in Corporate Finance Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1482–84 
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First, it presents a framework for analyzing the relationship 
between three types of uncertainty relevant to legal 
decision-making: legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and 
law-fact uncertainty. Although others have addressed these types 
of uncertainty individually (and occasionally in pairs),14 this 
Article is the first systematic presentation of the relationship 
between these types of uncertainty and regulatory design. It is 
also the first systematically to consider the relationship between 
these types of uncertainty and the time at which a decision is 
made. 
Second, this Article suggests that there are fundamental 
limits to how much legal certainty can be achieved. These limits 
apply both to legal systems generally and to specific areas within 
a legal system. The analysis approaches legal requirements from 
the familiar perspective of distinguishing between rules and 
standards. It then considers the degree to which making a 
requirement either more rule-like or more complex can increase 
legal certainty. It argues that there are fundamental limits to 
how much either option can increase legal certainty. (The Article 
does not seek to measure these limits; it seeks only to establish 
that they exist.) 
                                                       
(criticizing the tendency of courts to favor rules rather than standards in corporate 
finance case law); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011) (arguing that simplicity and clarity in the rules of federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction is an unattainable goal); Timothy Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7 
LEGAL THEORY 379, 379 (2001) (arguing that law is necessarily vague—and that this is a 
good thing); Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2011, at 133 (arguing that legal uncertainty is desirable when 
lawmakers wish to reduce the degree to which legal rules affect ex ante decision-making); 
Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better 
for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2010) (arguing that 
standards are often superior to rules in allowing people to predict the consequences of 
their actions in the manner necessary for capitalism and liberalism); see also Julian J. Z. 
Polaris, Note, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balancing Specificity and Ambiguity in 
Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 233–34 (2014) (suggesting that the 
SEC should, in its regulation of financial wrongdoing, rely on a combination of bright-line 
rules and a “backstop” of ambiguous standards to “discourage[] attempts to exploit 
loopholes in bright-line rules”). For an earlier paper calling for additional academic focus 
on “the subject of how much detail we should have in the law,” see Gordon Tullock, On the 
Desirable Degree of Detail in the Law, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 199, 199 (1995). For an 
argument against an exaggerated focus on certainty in constitutional theory, see DANIEL 
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED 
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). For a much broader argument against 
the use of detailed rules in government decision-making (including a proposal for five 
constitutional amendments to make this possible), see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF 
NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT (2014). This 
literature is discussed below infra Part III.A.  
 14. See infra Part III.B (discussing observations by Jerome Frank and H.L.A. Hart 
on the connection between legal and factual uncertainty).  
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Third, the Article sets out four tentative propositions about 
the relationship between uncertainty and regulatory design. 
First, pockets of legal uncertainty may at times increase, rather 
than decrease, the overall level of legal certainty in a particular 
regulatory system or legal field.15 Second, in any particular 
regulatory field, large swings over time between high levels of 
certainty and uncertainty are less desirable than a consistently 
moderate level of legal uncertainty. Third, arguments over legal 
certainty are rarely distributionally neutral and are often 
window dressing for fundamentally distributional arguments. 
Fourth, uncertainty about the content of future legal 
requirements is qualitatively different from uncertainty about 
the application of existing legal requirements. 
Following this Introduction, Part II provides background 
information on the three types of uncertainty addressed in this 
Article, the jurisprudential concepts of “rules” and “standards,” 
and the simplicity and complexity of legal requirements. Part III 
addresses the three types of uncertainty in more detail and 
describes factors relevant to the role each plays in regulatory 
design. Part IV focuses on legal uncertainty and suggests that 
there are fundamental limits on the amount of certainty in any 
legal requirement or set of legal requirements. These 
fundamental limits fall into two categories: limits on the amount 
of legal certainty that can be achieved by making a requirement 
more rule-like, and limits on the amount of legal certainty that 
can be achieved by making a requirement more complex. Part V 
sets out four propositions about the choice between certainty and 
uncertainty in regulatory design. It suggests overall that legal 
uncertainty is unavoidable in functioning regulatory systems, but 
that the amount of legal uncertainty is not constant and that all 
types of legal uncertainty are not equally good or bad. Careful 
regulatory design should seek not to minimize legal uncertainty, 
but to choose a level and type of legal uncertainty that will best 
serve the overall goals of the relevant regulatory system. Part VI 
concludes with a short summary of the Article’s core claims. 
II. BACKGROUND  
This Part introduces concepts that will be discussed 
throughout the Article. The first is the three types of uncertainty 
relevant to legal decision-making: legal uncertainty, factual 
                                                       
 15. A similar position is expressed in some of the rules-standards, jurisprudence, 
and codification literature. See infra Part III.A This Article integrates this insight into a 
larger framework for understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. 
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uncertainty, and law-fact uncertainty. The second is the idea that 
legal requirements can be broadly categorized as ranging from 
“rules” to “standards.” The third addresses the characteristics 
that can make a legal requirement “simple” or “complex.” 
A. Types of Uncertainty 
The focus of this Article is on the role of legal uncertainty in 
regulation. But legal uncertainty does not exist in isolation. 
Factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty exist as well, and 
both play a major role in the decision-making of primary actors.16 
And understanding both is necessary to understand legal 
uncertainty. 
Legal uncertainty is uncertainty about the content of the 
law. It is the primary focus of this Article. Factual uncertainty is 
uncertainty about facts in the world. It may well dwarf legal 
uncertainty in the calculations of primary actors. Law-fact 
uncertainty is uncertainty not about the content of the law itself 
or the facts that exist in the world. It is, instead, uncertainty 
about how a decision-maker—a judge, jury, or agency—will apply 
law to fact.17 
The presence of these three types of uncertainty—legal, 
factual, and law-fact—highlights the relatively limited role legal 
                                                       
 16. The claim here is that dividing uncertainty into these three categories provides 
a useful way of thinking about the relationship between various types of uncertainty in 
regulatory systems. They are not intended as sharp divisions, and this Article does not 
make a metaphysical claim that each one somehow “exists” out there in the world 
independently of the others. Instead, the claim is simply that looking at these three types 
of uncertainty gives us a better way of thinking about regulatory design than we have if 
we treat the three together as a single idea. 
  Other, related divisions are of course possible. For example, from a formalist, 
natural law, or philosophical perspective it might be possible to focus on the distinction 
between the metaphysical question of whether law itself has a fixed, certain content and 
the epistemic question of whether particular decision-makers are able to determine the 
content of the law on any particular issue. These could be presented as two separate 
categories of legal uncertainty. From a strictly path-of-the-law Holmesian perspective or 
an extreme-legal-realist perspective, it might be possible to combine legal and factual 
uncertainty on the basis that what courts will do in the future (and, accordingly, what the 
law is) is simply a question of fact. From yet another perspective, it might be possible to 
focus on the role that the attitudes or ideologies of regulated parties and regulatory 
designers play in shaping the certainty of a legal requirement. 
  However, each of these possibilities go beyond the scope of this Article. The 
contention here is not that legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and law-fact 
uncertainty are the only types of uncertainty relevant to regulatory design. It is simply 
that this tripartite breakdown illuminates some issues that are otherwise obscure and 
accordingly helps us think more clearly about the role of legal uncertainty in regulatory 
design. 
 17. Cf. Russell Pannier, D’Amato, Kripke, and Legal Indeterminacy, 27 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 881, 883 (2000) (noting distinction between claims that “mixed law and 
fact” decisions are indeterminate and that “legal rules” themselves are indeterminate). 
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uncertainty plays in the full range of uncertainties faced by 
primary actors. Factual uncertainty cannot be eliminated in 
regulation; it is an inherent element of the human experience. 
Law-fact uncertainty can be increased or decreased to some 
degree, but is likely to remain an important element in most 
real-world regulatory programs.18 Given these important sources 
of uncertainty, legal uncertainty may not be as disabling to 
primary actors as many standard discussions suggest.19 
B. Rules and Standards 
It is broadly accepted that legal requirements exist on a 
continuum from pure “rules” to pure “standards.” A large 
literature attests to the value of the rule-standard distinction in 
the analysis of a wide range of legal fields.20 This literature can 
be roughly divided into three groups. The first is those works 
explicitly using the terms “rule” and “standard” to describe a 
largely consistent set of ideas.21 These works tend to build on 
                                                       
 18. Consider, for example, whether it is likely that we will reach a point where the 
selection of decision-makers—an individual judge, jury, or agency official—is not 
perceived as potentially influencing the outcome of borderline cases. The importance of 
the decision-maker’s identity is discussed further infra Part III.C. 
 19. These three types of uncertainty are discussed in more detail infra Part III. 
 20. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 
1024–26 & nn.284–323 app. (1995) (illustrating the rule-standard distinction in a wide 
range of legal fields). 
 21. See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 138–41 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 15–63 (1987); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 
(Frederick Schauer ed., 2011) (posthumously published manuscript); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42–61 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE 
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN 
LIFE (1991); Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the 
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982) (using the rule-standard 
framework to analyze the Uniform Commercial Code’s approach to the battle-of-forms in 
sales law); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008) (using the rule-standard 
framework to conduct an empirical analysis of case law under the Voting Rights Act); 
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 49 (2007); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65 (1983) (examining the appropriate level of precision in agency rulemaking, 
through a case study of agency-promulgated legal requirements governing airline-pilot 
retirement, national-bank chartering, determining eligibility for social security disability 
payments, and granting permanent residence to aliens); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (using 
the rule-standard framework to conduct an economic analysis of the level of “precision or 
specificity” of legal requirements); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
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each other and display an awareness that they are dealing with a 
set of concepts that can be applied in multiple legal fields. The 
second encompasses those works (often, but not always, older) 
that discuss the same ideas as the rule-standard literature but 
without using that terminology.22 A third uses the ideas of rules 
and standards as a starting point, then goes on to argue for the 
current or future existence of new legal forms that do not exist on 
the rule-standard continuum.23 
                                                       
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (positing that the difference between rules and 
standards rests entirely on the difference between ex post and ex ante application of law, 
and presenting economic analysis of when each is desirable from the perspective of overall 
social welfare); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (using the rule-standard framework to examine the 
relationship between individualism and altruism in private law); Adam I. Muchmore, 
Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 171 (2013) (using the 
rule-standard framework to examine extraterritorial regulation by the United States); 
Rabin, supra note 12 (discussing the development of rules and standards in tort law); 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (using the 
rule-standard framework to examine the law of property); Scalia, supra note 6 (surveying 
the rules applicable to statutory interpretation); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (using the rule-standard framework to examine the general 
structure of legal arguments); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991  
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) 
(using the rule-standard framework to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 term); 
Sunstein, supra note 20 (examining arguments for and against structuring legal 
requirements as rules); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 58 (Andrei Marmor & Scott 
Soames eds., 2011) (using the rule-standard framework to discuss the degree to which 
legal requirements can guide action). 
 22. For literature discussing the rule-standard concept but with different 
terminology, see, for example, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 166 (1921); JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 141–56 (1927); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A 
COMPLEX WORLD 37–38 (1995) (exploring the trade-off between “simple rules” and “justice 
in the individual case”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130–32 (2d ed. 1994) 
(discussing open-textured legal requirements); HOLMES, supra note 12, at 111–29; 
HOWARD, supra note 13; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 946 (1987) (discussing the role of standard-like balancing 
tests in constitutional law, without explicitly emphasizing the rule-standard distinction); 
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960) (arguing for an 
absolutist interpretation of the Bill of Rights). 
  For the classic rule-standard disputes between Justice Black (rules) and Justice 
Frankfurter (standards), compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
588–89 (1952) (Black, J.), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70–75 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and 
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For other famous cases pitting 
rules against standards, see, for example, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 
U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (choosing a rule for railroad-crossing cases); Pokora v. Wabash 
Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (limiting Goodman and instead choosing a 
standard for railroad-crossing cases). 
 23. There are currently at least two papers in this third category. The first, an 
article by Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, argues for recognition of what they see as 
an existing-but-not-yet-recognized legal form, the “catalog.” Parchomovsky & Stein, supra 
note 9, at 168 (“A catalog, as it is defined in this Essay, consists of an outright ban on a 
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Legal requirements structured as rules specify outcomes ex 
ante—before the relevant transaction or event occurs.24 Pure 
                                                       
detailed, but incomplete, list of specific activities and a general prohibition of all activities 
falling into the same category. Accordingly, a typical catalog would contain a specific 
enumeration of proscribed conduct and a general provision empowering courts to penalize 
or enjoin other similar activities.”). They believe the catalog “integrate[s] the advantages 
of rules and standards while minimizing their shortcomings.” Id. at 181. 
  The second, a working paper by Tony Casey and Anthony Niblett, argues that 
upcoming advances in predictive and communication technology will make both rules and 
standards obsolete. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and 
Standards (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 550, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826. They believe that rules, standards, and everything in 
between will be replaced by a new form of law that they call the “micro-directive.” Id. 
(suggesting that legislative goals will be “translated by machines into a vast catalog of 
simple commands for all possible scenarios,” such that “[w]hen an individual citizen faces 
a legal choice, the machine will select from the catalog and communicate to that 
individual the precise context-specific command (the micro-directive) necessary for 
compliance”). Casey and Niblett believe that the micro-directive will “provide all of the 
benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either.” Id. at 2.  
  A detailed discussion of the Parchomovsky-Stein and Casey-Niblett papers is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Overall, this Article parts from the Parchomovsky/Stein 
and Casey/Niblett positions on the question of whether “rule” and “standard” are two 
ultimate endpoints on a continuum of possible legal forms. This Article takes the position 
that they are ultimate endpoints, and that any legal requirement is necessarily rule, 
standard, or some point between the two. See infra Part IV. From this perspective, both 
catalogs and micro-directives are simply legal requirements that fall somewhere in 
between the “pure rule” and “pure standard” ends of the rule-standard continuum. 
  Nonetheless, both the catalog and the micro-directive are concepts that give us a 
useful shorthand for describing an important set of characteristics found in existing 
(catalogs) or possible future (micro-directive) legal requirements. In this, catalogs and 
micro-directives can be added to the helpful typology of legal requirements set out by Cass 
Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 959–68 (identifying “untrammeled discretion,” 
“rules,” “rules with excuses,” “presumptions,” “factors,” “standards,” “guidelines,” 
“principles,” and “analogies”). 
  The Casey-Niblett paper is still a working draft, but two further comments on 
its broad themes are necessary. First, a strong claim can be made that predictive 
technology will lead to major changes in where rules and standards exist in a legal 
system, and that this technology may reduce some of the costs associated with highly 
detailed laws. But even if lawmakers do delegate substantial law-making authority to 
computers, they still have to make a delegation—and that delegation itself can be 
structured as a rule, standard, or something in between. 
  Second, it seems unlikely that predictive and communication technology will 
eliminate judges and legal disputes. Even if computers do implement laws through highly 
detailed instructions to regulated parties, these are likely to be default rules rather than 
mandatory rules (at least outside of a totalitarian society). Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing the relationship between default rules and mandatory 
rules in contract law). There will often be room to litigate whether a given 
computer-generated rule should have been followed in a particular case. Detailed, 
computer-generated compliance directives will likely affect which disputes are litigated, 
which are settled, and on what terms particular disputes are settled. They may also 
increase the degree to which settlement terms mirror the likely outcome of a formally 
litigated dispute. But it is difficult to imagine a situation where computer-generated 
compliance directives largely eliminate lawsuits as we know them. 
 24. See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60. 
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rules do this by directing the decision-maker to consider only 
specific facts and to apply those facts mechanically to reach a 
predetermined outcome. Classic examples of rule-like 
requirements are a speed limit of 55 miles per hour and the U.S. 
Constitution’s requirement that the President must be at least 
thirty-five years old.25 
Legal requirements structured as standards specify 
outcomes ex post—after the relevant transaction or event 
occurs.26 Pure standards do this by directing the decision-maker 
to consider the totality of the circumstances relevant to the case. 
Classic examples of standard-like requirements include laws 
requiring driving at a “reasonable speed,” laws prohibiting 
“unconscionable” contracts,27 the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,”28 and the 
various balancing tests that exist throughout the law.29 
Rules and standards are themselves ideal types; real-world 
legal requirements exist on a continuum between the two.30 
Whether a requirement is closer to a rule or a standard depends 
in part on its linguistic structure and in part on the 
jurisprudence that has come to be associated with the 
requirement. For example, the First Amendment is phrased in a 
highly rule-like manner, providing that “Congress shall make no 
law” infringing various rights.31 However, case law interpreting 
the First Amendment generally requires courts to make ex post 
determinations by balancing First Amendment interests against 
                                                       
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60. 
 26. See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60. 
 27. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 29. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). For other examples 
in constitutional law, see Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 963–72 (describing the growth of 
balancing in constitutional law). 
 30. On treating rules and standards as a continuum, see, for example, Bayern, 
supra note 13, at 59; Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” 
Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: 
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25–30 (2000); Muchmore, supra note 21, 
at 180. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). An alternative interpretation suggested to me 
by a colleague is that the Amendment is in fact phrased as a standard because all of the 
objects of “make no law” are abstract concepts requiring interpretation at the point of 
application. I am not in a position to evaluate this from a historical perspective,  
but—given the Amendment’s original scope (applying only to the federal government)—I 
am inclined to the view that its structure and phrasing suggest a rule rather than a 
standard. 
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other constitutional values.32 Sometimes these interpretations 
stay consistent, and sometimes they shift over time. Several 
commentators have even suggested that courts cycle between 
rule-like and standard-like interpretations of particular legal 
requirements.33 
C. Simplicity and Complexity 
The concepts of legal simplicity and legal complexity defy 
single, simple explanations.34 Complexity is tied at least in part 
to the content of substantive law. Some areas of law are more 
                                                       
 32. See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) (describing the “careful 
balance” involved in determining the Free Speech rights of a public employee); see also 
Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 966–68 (describing the rise of balancing in First Amendment 
cases).  
 33. See, e.g., HART, supra note 22, at 130–31; Crane, supra note 21, at 59–61; Rose, 
supra note 21, at 595–97.  
 34. On the difficulty of defining simplicity and complexity, see BORIS I. BITTKER, 
Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1974) (“Neither ‘tax 
simplification’ nor its mirror image, complexity, is a concept that can be easily defined or 
measured.”). On the idea of simplicity, see generally Alan Baker, Simplicity, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2013 ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/simplicity/. For a sampling of writing on 
simplicity and complexity in law, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22; CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); Dodson, supra note 13; Werner 
Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (1974) 
(suggesting that efforts to increase legal certainty can result in increases in legal 
complexity that can approach or exceed the social benefits of the relevant increase in 
certainty); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 150 (1995) (presenting formal mathematical analysis of the effects of legal 
complexity on compliance with legal requirements under different enforcement regimes); 
Daniel Martin Katz & M. J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Complexity of the Law: the 
United States Code, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 337 (2014) (presenting a 
quantitative analysis of the complexity of different titles of the United States Code); John 
A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the 
Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining the effects of complexity on the 
degree of certainty in tax law); Lumen N. Mulligan, Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple 
or Accessible Ones, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 13 (2011) (responding to Dodson, supra note 
13); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal 
Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191 (2015) (proposing the application of empirical 
complexity science to law, in particular by developing a computerized “Legal Maps” 
application that would provide a layered map of the legal system roughly analogous to 
existing, geographically-focused applications such as “Google Maps”); Peter H. Schuck, 
Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) 
(analyzing legal complexity generally); Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1129 (suggesting that codification of statutes, a technique intended to simplify 
law, lowers the transaction costs legislatures face in enacting detailed legal 
requirements—and accordingly results in a more complex legal system); Tullock, supra 
note 13, at 202–05 (discussing incentive structures leading to complex legal requirements 
and calling for additional research on the appropriate level of precision in law); R. George 
Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less 
Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000) (examining different types of complexity in law 
and suggesting that a legal change reducing complexity in one area also typically results 
in an offsetting increase in legal complexity in one or more other areas). 
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complex than others, and certain substantive policy choices 
cannot be implemented without a significant level of 
complexity.35 Both complex language and simple language can be 
a source of complexity.36 A legal requirement can be complex in 
itself or complex because it is difficult to describe.37 
Legal requirements tend to be more complex the more 
conduct they seek to regulate;38 the more technical expertise they 
require to understand;39 the greater the compliance costs they 
involve;40 the more difficult they are to contract around;41 the 
more total components they involve;42 the more variety there is in 
the types of components they involve;43 the more difficult they 
are to apply for those who understand them in theory;44 the more 
potential enforcers (and the variety of potential enforcers) they 
involve;45 the more they involve choices between competing 
values;46 the more that compliance with them involves simple, 
intuitive responses rather than deliberative and reflective 
thinking;47 and the more they involve consequences for third 
parties48 (and the greater the magnitude of those consequences, 
and the distances in location, relationship, or time at which they 
can be felt). 
In other words, complexity is itself a complex concept. This 
Article emphasizes those aspects of complexity most directly tied 
to the structure of the legal requirement itself. Accordingly, this 
Article treats legal complexity as a function of the number, 
                                                       
 35. See Bittker, supra note 34, at 1–2 (noting that, because of the wide variety of 
circumstances it must address, “[i]ncome taxation entails a high level of irreducible 
complexity).  
 36. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 28; Bittker, supra note 34, at 2. On the possibility 
that even a simple rule, such as “no vehicles in the park,” can be uncertain, see SCHAUER, 
supra note 21, at 58–59, 212–14 (describing famous debate on this language between 
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller—and its significance for jurisprudence more generally). 
 37. Wright, supra note 34, at 728–32. 
 38. Schuck, supra note 34, at 3.  
 39. Id. at 4; see also Diver, supra note 21, at 67–68; Miller, supra note 34, at 12. 
 40. EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 25–27.  
 41. Id. at 27.  
 42. Wright, supra note 34, at 723. 
 43. Id. at 724.  
 44. Miller, supra note 34, at 12. 
 45. Schuck, supra note 34, at 16–17; see also Diver, supra note 21, at 67; Wright, 
supra note 34, at 726. 
 46. Miller, supra note 34, at 12. 
 47. SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 42.  
 48. Wright, supra note 34, at 721 (describing as complex a dispute “in which any 
resolution is likely to have difficult-to-predict, indirect consequences for the parties and 
for other groups perhaps not directly represented in the legal dispute,” and identifying 
this with Lon Fuller’s concept of a “polycentric” dispute (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978))). 
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variety, and difficulty of different determinations a 
decision-maker is required to make (or questions a 
decision-maker is required to answer) in applying a legal 
requirement.49 A requirement is simpler to the extent it requires 
fewer determinations; to the extent it involves determinations 
similar in type to each other; and to the extent those 
determinations are relatively simple for the relevant person 
(most likely either the decision-maker or the target of regulation) 
to make.50 As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, below, the 
simplicity or complexity of a legal requirement is independent of 
whether the requirement is structured as a rule or a standard.51 
Complexity is also associated with the costs of promulgating a 
legal requirement. At least with respect to rule-like 
requirements, complexity will typically increase the cost of rule 
promulgation.52 
One problem in discussing the complexity of legal 
requirements is that the effect of complexity varies with the 
resources available to the entity attempting to determine what 
the law requires.53 It is useful to think of legal complexity as 
having an absolute value, but with effect of that absolute value 
having a different effect on different primary actors and 
law-appliers.54 Deciphering complex legal requirements entails 
costs. These costs have two effects on primary actors. Up to a 
certain point (with that point varying among different entities), 
complex requirements simply raise compliance costs (and 
accordingly reduce profit margins) for the activity in question. 
Past that point, however, the costs of deciphering a complex legal 
                                                       
 49. See Wright, supra note 34, at 723. 
 50. Miller, supra note 34, at 12. 
 51. Or, more precisely, the location of a legal requirement on the 
simplicity-complexity axis is independent of where the requirement is located on the 
rule-standard axis. However, as discussed infra Part IV, this is not the case for the 
location of a legal requirement on the certainty-uncertainty continuum. The location of a 
legal requirement on the certainty-uncertainty continuum can depend, to a significant 
degree, on where the requirement falls in a quadrant made up of perpendicular, 
intersecting simplicity-complexity and rule-standard axes. 
 52. See Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1237; see also Kaplow, supra note 21, at 579–80. 
 53. Available resources can include intellectual capacity, experience, training, and 
time available—and of course money, which can be used to purchase assistance in 
deciphering a complex requirement. One example of the role of intellectual capacity, 
experience, and training is the highly detailed set of rules that airline pilots must 
internalize—and be able to act on at an instant’s notice. See Tullock, supra note 13, at 
206. 
 54. In other words, a legal requirement has an objective level of complexity. But 
this objective level of complexity has a different set of subjective effects on different 
primary actors and law-appliers, each of which has a different cost–benefit calculation to 
make with respect to the value of becoming informed about the content of the 
requirement. 
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requirement outweigh the associated benefits of compliance.55 In 
such a situation, entities can do one of two things: (1) ignore the 
requirement and suffer the consequences if their noncompliance 
becomes known; or (2) cease or avoid engaging in the activities 
the complex requirement governs. 
Because the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance will 
vary among primary actors (and perhaps even among judicial 
and quasi-judicial decision-makers), caution is required when 
making blanket statements about the effects of complexity. The 
costs of complexity are not evenly distributed. 
III. LEGAL, FACTUAL, AND LAW-FACT UNCERTAINTY 
Legal uncertainty is not the only type of uncertainty 
confronting primary actors.56 Factual uncertainty and law-fact 
uncertainty exist as well, and both play a role in the 
decision-making of primary actors. Accordingly, even complete 
legal certainty cannot come close to eliminating the uncertainty 
faced by primary actors in their interactions with the law. This 
Part identifies key aspects of how legal, factual, and law-fact 
uncertainty each operate. As this Part will demonstrate, the 
scope of factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty is huge. 
Once factual and law-fact uncertainty are taken into 
consideration, legal uncertainty plays a much diminished role. 
Part III.A addresses legal uncertainty, or uncertainty about 
the content of the law. It addresses two factors critical to 
understanding the role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design. 
The first is time—whether the uncertainty pertains to past, 
present, or future law. The second is form—whether the 
uncertain legal requirement is a rule or a standard, and whether 
the requirement is simple or complex.57 
                                                       
 55. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 34, at 151. Specifically, Kaplow points out that the costs 
of acquiring information about the content of a legal requirement (which increase with the 
complexity of the requirement) are an important component of a primary actor’s 
compliance costs. And, accordingly, a more complex requirement will result in lower 
overall compliance than a less complex requirement mandating similar behavior. 
 56. See supra Part II.A. 
 57. This Article does not take the position that simplicity and complexity are solely 
matters of form. Simplicity and complexity have substantive components as well. 
However, the Article does take the position that a legal requirement’s form (as well as its 
substance) can range from simple to complex. This simplicity-complexity continuum can 
be modeled as intersecting with the traditional rules-standards continuum to provide a 
better framework for analysis than the rules-standards continuum alone. See Muchmore, 
supra note 21, at 176–80 (providing and illustrating this model); see also Kaplow, supra 
note 21, at 588–90 (suggesting that both rules and standards can be either simple or 
complex).  
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Part III.B addresses factual uncertainty, or uncertainty 
about facts in the world. It addresses three factors critical to 
understanding the role of factual uncertainty in regulatory 
design. The first, like legal uncertainty, is time—factual 
uncertainty plays different roles depending on whether it relates 
to past, present, or future facts. The second is the degree to 
which factual uncertainty involves the limits of scientific 
knowledge. Many regulatory programs involve decisions on 
issues where no scientific consensus exists or where the 
consensus changes dramatically over short periods of time. The 
third is the degree to which human observational capacities and 
resources constrain our ability to learn relevant facts. 
Part III.C addresses law-fact uncertainty, or uncertainty 
about how a decision-maker—a judge, jury, or agency—will apply 
law to fact.58 It addresses four factors critical to understanding 
the role of law-fact uncertainty in regulatory design. The first is 
the degree to which the law is certain with respect to the issue in 
question. The second is the range of attitudes or ideologies held 
by potential decision-makers. This range is affected heavily by 
the procedures by which decision-makers are chosen and the 
population from which they are drawn. The third is the degree to 
which the relevant decision-maker is subject to outside influence 
(whether proper or improper). The fourth is the degree to which 
the decision made in a given case will limit the decision-makers’ 
range of discretion in similar, future decisions. 
A. Legal Uncertainty 
Legal uncertainty is uncertainty about the content of the 
law.59 It has attracted the attention of writers for centuries. 
Much of the work comes from those engaged in broader 
jurisprudential debates about the relevance of legal uncertainty 
for the nature of law or the obligation to obey the law.60 I draw on 
                                                       
 58. See supra note 17. 
 59. The preferred term in current jurisprudential writing for what this Article calls 
“legal uncertainty” is “indeterminacy.” This Article uses the term “legal uncertainty” 
instead because it is more easily comprehensible to those not familiar with technical 
jurisprudential writing and matches better with writing outside the jurisprudential field. 
It also emphasizes the relationship this Article strives to highlight between legal 
uncertainty and two related topics, factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty.  
 60. Jurisprudential views of legal uncertainty range over a broad spectrum. At one 
extreme is Ronald Dworkin’s view that legal uncertainty does not exist, as there is a 
single right answer even in hard cases. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
279–90 (1977). At the other extreme is Anthony D’Amato’s view that legal certainty does 
not exist, as there is no such thing as an easy case with a single right answer. See 
Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 167–68 (1990). 
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this work for the light it shines on the practical function of legal 
uncertainty in regulatory systems. But it is not my goal to 
engage in these broader jurisprudential debates. For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to note that a broad range of 
jurisprudential views are compatible with the idea that 
real-world legal requirements can, as a practical matter, have 
different levels of legal certainty.61 
Outside the technical jurisprudential field, the focus of 
writing about legal uncertainty moves away from the question of 
whether it exists in theory or is compatible with the rule of law. 
Instead, writers focus on legal uncertainty’s practical effects. 
A substantial portion of this writing focuses on how judges 
should respond to legal uncertainty in two relationships: the 
relationship between legislatures and judges, and the 
relationship between higher courts and lower courts. In recent 
decades, Justice Antonin Scalia was the most prominent judicial 
advocate of this vision of legal certainty, advocating rules over 
                                                       
   There are, of course, a wide range of perspectives in between complete legal 
certainty and complete legal uncertainty. H.L.A. Hart saw legal uncertainty as a real but 
marginal phenomenon tied to the open texture of language. HART, supra note 22, at  
128–32; BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL 
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 74 (2007). Timothy Endicott sees law as 
necessarily vague, to a nontrivial degree. TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 2 
(2000) (arguing that vagueness makes the law uncertain “in some cases but not in all 
cases”). 
  The legal realists viewed legal uncertainty as a broader phenomenon tied to 
conflicting, legitimate interpretive approaches and the specific facts of each individual 
case. LEITER, supra, at 74–75. Among the realists, a mainstream group saw legal 
uncertainty as limited by the cultural norms, including the relatively similar background 
and experiences of the individuals who became judges. Id. at 28–30. Leiter describes this 
as realism’s “Sociological Wing.” Id. at 28. This group included Karl Llewellyn, Underhill 
Moore, Herber Oliphant, Felix Cohen, and Max Radin. Id. at 29. A smaller, more radical 
group of realists saw the idiosyncratic personal experiences of each individual judge as 
injecting a much larger element of legal uncertainty. Id. at 28–30. Leiter describes this as 
realism’s “Idiosyncracy Wing.” Id. at 28. Jerome Frank was the most prominent member 
of this group; it also included Joseph Hutcheson and Edward Robinson. Id. 
 61. Even Ronald Dworkin, probably the best-known proponent of complete legal 
certainty as a theoretical matter, does not argue that human decision-makers can know 
they have reached a legally correct decision. See DWORKIN, supra note 60, at 279–90. This 
possibility is open only to the idealized decision-maker he calls Hercules. Id. at 105–06. 
And Dworkin expressly admits the possibility that there are both easy cases and hard 
cases. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 353–54 (1986). On the other side, even those who 
argue (or approach arguing) that the law is completely indeterminate in theory do not 
appear to challenge the idea that, as a practical matter, some legal requirements lead to a 
more predictable set of outcomes than others do. See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 60, at 171 
(“For the Pragmatic Indeterminist, judges do not behave randomly or unpredictably over 
the long run of cases; . . . lawyers can predict how judges will probably decide a given case 
or line of cases.”). Thus, whatever one’s view of the scope of legal uncertainty in theory, 
there is value to considering the practical role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design. 
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standards in the form of legal requirements,62 textualism in 
statutory interpretation,63 and originalism in constitutional 
interpretation.64 And, as one would expect for views set out so 
forcefully by a long-serving Supreme Court Justice, there has 
been no shortage of responses to Justice Scalia’s views.65 
Other writings look at the role of legal certainty in specific 
fields, often with a focus on the role of rules and standards. This 
has been done in numerous legal fields, including administrative 
law, antitrust,66 civil procedure,67 constitutional law,68 
international conflict-of-laws,69 property,70 and torts.71 
Although it remains standard to assume that legal certainty 
is an unalloyed good, there is a growing literature suggesting 
that legal certainty may have some disadvantages—and legal 
uncertainty some positive attributes. First, Shawn Bayern has 
argued that lawyers and judges often overstate the value of legal 
certainty when making common-law arguments or decisions.72 
                                                       
 62. Scalia, supra note 6. 
 63. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a 
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the 
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
3, 23–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 64. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–36 (2008) (Scalia, J.); 
see also Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: 
Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1064 
(2009) (“Whatever version of originalism was on display, it was the predominant mode of 
argument for the majority.”). In arguing for each of these, Scalia’s rhetoric focused on the 
need for these largely formalist approaches as a way to constrain judicial discretion. 
Scalia, supra note 63, at 25 (“Of all of the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most 
mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule 
of law is about form.”). In other words, Scalia’s view was that law must be treated as 
certain to prevent judges from imposing their own policy preferences in the guise of 
deciding concrete cases. 
 65. This is, of course, an understatement. No footnote could possibly contain the full 
range of responses to Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential vision. For a few notable responses, 
see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 41–47 
(1994); Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 
1328–30 (2008); Richard A. Posner, How Nuanced Is Justice Scalia’s Judicial Philosophy? 
An Exchange, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/107001/how 
-nuanced-justice-scalias-judicial-philosophy-exchange. 
 66. Crane, supra note 21, at 55. 
 67. Dodson, supra note 13, at 56–59 (suggesting that legal uncertainty cannot be 
eliminated from the law of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).  
 68. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 56–69. 
 69. Muchmore, supra note 21, at 183–86. 
 70. Rose, supra note 21, at 582–83.  
 71. Rabin, supra note 12, at 431–38 (describing the historical development of tort 
law from a largely rule-based system to one in which rules and standards “resolved into a 
state of equipoise”). 
 72. Bayern, supra note 13, at 53 (maintaining that “arguments about certainty are 
often mistaken, that certainty itself is often misunderstood, and that many defenses of 
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Second, legal certainty may not be realistically attainable—and 
accordingly not worth the effort.73 Third, legal uncertainty can 
make it possible—when lawmakers wish to do so—to reduce, 
rather than increase, the degree to which legal rules affect 
primary behavior.74 Fourth, in some situations, uncertain legal 
requirements make it easier for people to predict the legal 
consequences of their actions than would be possible with a more 
certain requirement.75 
Overall, a legal requirement tends to be more certain to the 
extent it is expressed as a rule rather than a standard; is 
associated with a body of jurisprudence treating it as a rule; has 
in the recent past led to similar outcomes over a wide range of 
fact situations; and is not closely associated with other rules that 
would lead to a different outcome. A legal requirement tends to 
be less certain to the extent it is expressed as a standard rather 
than a rule; is associated with jurisprudence treating it as a 
standard; has in the past led to disparate outcomes in seemingly 
similar fact situations; or is closely associated with an alternative 
legal requirement (especially if structured as a rule) that would 
lead to disparate outcomes if applied in its place. 
Two factors critical to understanding the way legal 
uncertainty operates are time and legal form. Part III.A.1 
addresses time, with an emphasis on the relationship between 
                                                       
certainty in legal rules are tautological, irrelevant, or substantively overstated”). Bayern’s 
argument focuses on the degree to which “social judgments” may require changes in case 
outcomes and legal rules. Id. at 55–56. Bayern discusses specific examples where he 
believes certainty-related arguments to be either wholly irrelevant or far outweighed by 
other substantive concerns. Id. at 58. These include situations where doctrinal stability is 
irrelevant to the issue in question, id. at 62–68, and situations where having a rule that is 
certain is irrelevant to the issue in question. Id. at 68–75. Bayern then critiques 
arguments for legal certainty based on the nature of law. Id. at 76–86. Specifically, 
Bayern disagrees with arguments by Larry Alexander and the early F.A. Hayek that legal 
certainty is necessary to the rule of law. Id. Bayern sides instead with Melvin Eisenberg’s 
position that some legal uncertainty is a permanent and necessary feature of common-law 
systems. Id. (citing MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 43–49 
(1988)). He then criticizes arguments for legal certainty based on grounds of economic 
efficiency. Id. at 87–89. 
  Bayern’s core claim—that arguments for legal certainty are often overstated—is 
correct. However, the roots of those overstatements go deeper, and spread more broadly, 
than Bayern asserts. The roots go deeper for two reasons. First, factual uncertainty, see 
infra Part III.B, and law-fact uncertainty, see infra Part III.C, reduce the degree to which 
even true legal certainty allows primary actors to know in advance the types of civil 
liability (or criminal charges) they could face. Second, there are fundamental limits on the 
degree to which efforts to increase legal certainty can be successful. Past a certain point, 
efforts to increase legal certainty will tend to reduce legal certainty instead. See infra Part 
IV. 
 73. See Dodson, supra note 13, at 55. 
 74. See Feldman & Lifshitz, supra note 13, at 166; Diver, supra note 21, at 78.  
 75. Raban, supra note 13, at 183. 
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uncertainty about past, present, and future law. Part III.A.2 
briefly addresses legal form, with an emphasis on the 
rule-standard and simple-complex dimensions. This discussion of 
legal form will be developed in more detail in Part IV. 
1. Time. The manner in which legal uncertainty operates 
depends in part on the temporal relationship between the legal 
uncertainty and the time at which a primary actor is making a 
decision. Legal uncertainty can operate with respect to past, 
present, or future law. 
Uncertainty with respect to past law involves uncertainty 
about future civil or criminal liability for a past action.76 Such 
uncertainty will impact the assessment of current or future 
budgets, political capital, and research or education 
expenditures. For example, this uncertainty impacts the amount 
of formal or informal liability reserves a primary actor might 
choose to hold. 
Uncertainty with respect to present law involves uncertainty 
with respect to whether a contemplated course of action will 
subject a primary actor to civil or criminal liability. To the extent 
the future is assumed to resemble the present, it will also affect a 
primary actor’s longer-term decisions about a particular course of 
action. This type of uncertainty prompts groups or individuals to 
complain that existing law fails to provide sufficiently concrete 
guidance.77 
Uncertainty with respect to future law involves uncertainty 
about what changes in the law some future lawmaker will (or 
will not) make.78 This is a huge source of uncertainty that is 
always present when contemplating an action beyond the very 
near future. Particularly salient examples involve tax law (where 
long-term investment decisions may involve tax advantages that 
could be repealed by a future lawmaker), decisions to invest in 
new technologies (where later-emerging health and safety 
concerns could lead to regulatory actions, up to and including 
                                                       
 76. For a dramatic example, see A Legal Hazard for Brazil’s Banks: The Past Is 
Epilogue, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2014, at 70, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and 
-economics/21595940-row-over-25-year-old-account-adjustments-unnerves-brazilian 
-lenders-past. 
 77. See, e.g., The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, supra note 8. 
 78. On congressional uncertainty about how authority Congress delegates will be 
implemented, see Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process 
or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 55–60 (1982); Morris P. Fiorina, 
Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986). 
(4) Muchmore_Final.doc (Do Not Delete)  5/22/16  7:22 PM 
2016]     UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY 1343 
bars on any use of a once-promising technology), and laws that 
shape the overall structure of an industry (such as health care).79 
2. Legal Form. The manner in which legal uncertainty 
operates also depends in part on just where a legal requirement 
lies on the rule-standard and simplicity-complexity dimensions.80 
The general assumption of existing literature is that rules tend 
to produce legal certainty and standards tend to produce 
uncertainty.81 The general assumption is also that more detailed 
(and thus more complex) legal requirements tend to provide more 
certainty than less detailed ones.82 Both of these are true—but 
only up to a point. After that point, making a requirement either 
more rule-like or more complex reduces that requirement’s 
overall legal certainty. Because Part IV addresses this topic in 
detail, further discussion of the relationship between legal 
uncertainty and legal form will be delayed until then. 
This Part (III.A) has focused on legal certainty. It has 
suggested that legal certainty is tied to two related concepts. The 
first is the time at which the uncertainty exists; the second is the 
form in which the legal requirement is structured. Next, Part 
III.B turns to a type of uncertainty that exists not only in law, 
but in all other fields of endeavor: uncertainty about actual facts 
as they exist in the world. 
B. Factual Uncertainty 
Factual uncertainty is fundamentally different from legal 
uncertainty. It is also far more common. Factual uncertainty 
—uncertainty about the world as it exists—impacts every 
human endeavor. But factual uncertainty plays a special role 
in situations where an individual or group must make 
determinations about some state of the world with legal or 
quasi-legal83 consequences. Lawmakers,84 primary actors,85 
                                                       
 79. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 2608 (2012) 
(upholding Affordable Care Act against first major challenge); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2495–96 (2015) (upholding Affordable Care Act against second major challenge).  
 80. See infra text accompanying notes 116–118. 
 81. See, e.g., Parchemovsky & Stein, supra note 9, at 173. 
 82. There are, of course, important exceptions here. For others taking the position 
that standards can at times be more certain than rules, see, for example, Rose, supra note 
21, at 609; Schlag, supra note 21, at 405–13. Also see further discussion infra Part V.A. 
 83. I include quasi-legal consequences explicitly to include private regulatory bodies 
that have not been delegated any official authority by the state. Basic decisions by private 
regulatory bodies (to admit or exclude, to provide or not provide resources, etc.) can have 
substantial impacts within the relevant community that are not distant in effect from 
those made by government authorities. 
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regulatory enforcers,86 and those who serve as factfinders in 
formal disputes87 must all make these types of 
determinations. As H.L.A. Hart recognized, there is a deep 
relationship between legal and factual uncertainty.88 Perfect 
                                                       
 84. Lawmakers must make numerous factual determinations in the law-making or 
rule-making process. For example, a legislator considering, in the late 1970s, whether to 
support the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act might have asked himself some of the following 
questions: Is foreign bribery a problem? If so, is it a big enough one that we should 
regulate it? If so, what type of legal requirement would be effective in reaching this 
conduct? How will this regulatory program impact our political support for future 
regulatory programs? Could the resources this program would require be better used in 
another program? Will this make American multinational businesses uncompetitive in 
global markets? Some of this decision-making will be done in formal fact-finding 
proceedings such as legislative or agency hearings. But far more is of the informal type 
that all individuals must make when deciding how to allocate their time and effort.  
  Legal certainty does not alter the need to make these decisions, and may not 
even alter the allocation decisions themselves. A strict liability regime with low damage 
payments may result in the same spending on worker or product safety as a negligence 
regime with higher damage payments if the expected value under both regimes is the 
same. It is the result of the expected value calculation, not the degree to which liability in 
individual cases is certain, that will determine the relevant allocation decisions. And it is 
the range of possible factual scenarios, rather than possible legal scenarios, which is 
likely to drive the expected value calculation. 
 85. Primary actors must make numerous factual assumptions in their day to day 
affairs precisely because of the legal consequences different facts may have. For example, 
a company must decide how to allocate resources between worker safety, product safety, 
research, insurance, and marketing. It cannot spend infinitely on any one of these and 
remain in business. Its allocation decisions must rest on a set of assumptions about likely 
injuries, new products, and sales that will be generated by each of these spending 
categories. 
 86. Regulatory enforcers must make factual determinations about whether a person 
or entity is doing something that might violate a legal requirement. Sometimes this is 
fairly clear, such as when a police officer uses radar to clock a car speeding at 90 mph. At 
other times, especially in the regulation of business, the regulator may not be able to 
observe whether potentially illegal behavior is taking place until after initiating the 
investigation. At this point, legal certainty may work for or against the regulator. If a 
regulatory requirement is legally certain, the regulator cannot enforce it successfully 
unless it finds very specific facts in its investigation. For such a certain requirement, even 
a large amount of evidence of general bad behavior is not sufficient. When a regulatory 
requirement is less certain (but still of similar scope), however, the types of evidence that 
can be used to support a violation may be broader. This makes it much harder for a 
company to skirt the precise edge of a regulation by avoiding certain actions while still 
behaving in a manner very much outside the spirit of the regulatory requirement. 
 87. This is the type of factual uncertainty that served as a focus of Jerome Frank’s 
work. Frank’s view of law was based heavily on the factual uncertainty involved in 
trial-court decisions. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960, at 165–67 
(1986) (discussing Frank’s fact skepticism and noting that, while Frank “wobbled” in some 
of his views, “he never ceased to emphasize that the principal cause of legal uncertainty 
was [factual] subjectivity at the trial court level”). Frank identified himself as part of a 
group of “fact skeptics” who “think[] that . . . the pursuit of greatly increased legal 
certainty is, for the most part, futile” because of extensive factual uncertainty. JEROME 
FRANK, Preface to the Sixth Printing of LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, at xi–xii (Anchor 
Books 1963) (1930).  
 88. HART, supra note 22, at 128. 
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certainty about legal consequences cannot exist in a world 
where we do not have perfect information about future states 
of the world.89 As Daniel Farber has highlighted, factual 
uncertainty becomes increasingly important when it involves 
complex systems with the potential for feedback effects.90 
These effects make outcomes (whether positive or negative) 
both more extreme and more likely than might otherwise be 
thought.91 
Three factors relevant to factual certainty are time (past, 
present, or future), limits on scientific knowledge, and limits on 
human observational capacity.92 Each will be discussed in turn 
below. 
1.  Time.  As with legal uncertainty, the significance of 
factual uncertainty varies based on timing. Uncertainty with 
respect to past facts impacts civil and criminal dispute resolution 
(where fact-finding is a core aspect), forward-looking regulatory 
programs that seek to compensate for something that has taken 
place in the past, and efforts to set appropriate compensation for 
past events. Environmental regulation is a particularly 
important example. A core problem in efforts to combat global 
warming or maintain safe drinking water is uncertainty about 
how much damage has in fact been done in the past. Uncertainty 
with respect to present facts impacts daily decision-making by 
both regulators and primary actors.93 For example, regulators 
might ask questions such as: Has the recession ended? Does this 
new drug have dangerous side effects? Is this bridge safe? 
Similarly, primary actors might ask: Is our product safe? Is the 
driver swerving in the lane ahead drunk? Do consumers have a 
favorable view or our business? 
Uncertainty with respect to future facts impacts 
forward-looking regulatory programs, strategic planning (and 
                                                       
 89. Id. Hart viewed all legal systems as a compromise between the general need for 
legal certainty and the need for some flexibility in applying law to unanticipated future 
fact situations. Id. at 130. He saw the balance between certainty and flexibility as one 
that could vary broadly between legal systems and over periods of time within the same 
legal system. Id. at 130–31. 
 90. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 920–27 (2011). 
 91. See id. 
 92. The universe of factual uncertainty is broad, and I do not mean to suggest that 
the factors listed here are the only relevant ones. They are simply three factors 
particularly important to the relationship between factual uncertainty and regulatory 
systems. 
 93. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 304 (“Any present fact which is unknown to the 
parties is just as uncertain for the purposes of making an arrangement at this moment, as 
any future fact.”). 
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basic decision-making) by primary actors, and determinations of 
appropriate penalties in deterrence-based systems.94 
2. Scientific Knowledge.  Although it overlaps to some 
degree with uncertainty as to more basic facts, uncertainty with 
respect to scientific knowledge has particular characteristics 
worth addressing separately.95 At least two types of uncertainty 
with respect to scientific knowledge are important to regulatory 
programs. First, when no scientific consensus exists, regulators 
must deal with uncertainty about which scientific positions to 
credit. Second, some uncertainty with respect to scientific 
knowledge is always present even if scientists are generally in 
agreement at a particular point in time. As the Supreme Court 
famously remarked in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., “[T]here are no certainties in science.”96 Although the Court 
prefaced this remark with a precatory “arguably,’’ it is accepted 
in the history and philosophy of science that all scientific theories 
are subject to revision.97 Although some scientific facts are quite 
secure, many firmly held scientific beliefs have been set aside in 
favor of newer theories. Much of what we “know” today will likely 
be shown, in the future, to be incorrect.98 
3. Observational Capacity and Observational Resources.  
Scientific and other uncertainty exists, in part, because of limits 
in human observational capacity. These limits are one source of 
both scientific and factual uncertainty. The simple fact that a 
phenomenon occurs in our presence does not mean that it is 
observed in a way that can be useful to any regulatory program. 
                                                       
 94. On the tendency of any statute to become obsolete over time, see GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–7 (1982); GRANT GILMORE, THE 
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96–97 (1977). On obsolete Supreme Court decisions, see id. at  
97–98. On the difficulties involved in decisions to commit resources to combat future 
risks, see Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the 
Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1517–20 (2010). 
 95. On scientific uncertainty, see generally HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND 
LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 8–17; Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the 
Food and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 1003–06 (1977).  
 96. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 97. However, not all revisions—even those that amount to paradigm shifts—alter 
the established facts within the older paradigm. Newton’s inverse square law for 
gravitational attraction, for example, remains useful and reasonably accurate in 
important domains notwithstanding Einstein’s more complex field equations. 
 98. Cf. DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 8.7.2 (2d ed. 2011) (collecting 
recent examples from the history of medicine); POSNER, supra note 21, at 64–65 
(discussing broadly-accepted scientific theories later proved false and providing reasons 
why it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to ever prove a scientific theory is true). 
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Moreover, observation can be costly. Even basic visual, oral, 
and olfactory observation requires a person’s time; techniques 
requiring specialized equipment or expertise will often be more 
expensive.99 
In sum, factual certainty is tied to three related concepts: 
time; scientific knowledge; and human observational capacity 
and resources. But uncertainty about facts, as well as 
uncertainty about the law, is only part of the picture. Even a 
primary actor that knows the facts and the law with certainty 
encounters uncertainty about the application of law to fact. 
C. Law-Fact Uncertainty 
Law-fact uncertainty is uncertainty about the way the 
ultimate decision-maker will apply law to fact.100 This type of 
uncertainty is best understood by taking both the law itself and 
the facts to which it is to be applied as a given constant. Even 
with the law and facts at a given constant, different 
decision-makers will reach different conclusions on how the law 
applies to some sets of facts. The reasons for this uncertainty can 
include: the decision-maker’s competence; the range of potential 
ideologies of the decision-maker, the decision-maker’s 
susceptibility to outside influence, and the degree to which the 
decision today will affect the decision-maker’s future freedom of 
decision. 
1. Decision-Maker’s Competence.  The first factor 
implicating the degree of law-fact uncertainty is the 
decision-maker’s competence. A decision-maker without the 
background, intellectual capacity, resources, or time necessary to 
understand the law or the facts will be prone to error. For 
example, there may be cases where the factual or legal issues are 
sufficiently complex to be beyond the ability of many 
decision-makers to understand. This is particularly relevant in 
                                                       
 99. A few examples of expensive technological aids to perception are night vision 
equipment, latent fingerprint development and identification, STR-based DNA profiling, 
satellite imaging, mass spectroscopy, medical imaging, and data mining techniques. Of 
course, some technologies operate at a sufficiently broad scale that they are less expensive 
than simple sensory observation. GPS tracking of an automobile, for example, permits 
extended surveillance that would be prohibitively expensive if conducted by a team of 
observers seeking to keep the vehicle in sight at all times. See United States v. Jones, 132 
S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 100. On the standards of decision involved in applications of law to fact, see 
generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013). 
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cases with large amounts of evidence or highly technical expert 
testimony. 
2. Range of Potential Attitudes or Ideologies.  The second 
factor impacting the degree of law-fact uncertainty is the range of 
attitudes or values potentially held by the decision-maker.101 This 
means that the identity of the decision-maker is likely to be more 
important where a decision is being made before the 
decision-maker has been identified;102 where a large number of 
different individuals (or groups of individuals) could be the 
ultimate decision-makers; and where there is significant 
ideological disagreement among the politically influential groups 
from whom decision-makers are drawn.103 
3. Decision-Makers’ Susceptibility to Outside Influence.  
The third factor influencing the degree of law-fact uncertainty is 
the degree to which the decision-maker may be susceptible to 
outside influence. While the potential attitudes or ideologies of 
the decision-maker are likely to be tied in significant part to the 
groups from which the decision-makers are drawn, here we are 
looking instead at the attitudes and ideologies of present (and 
potentially future) groups whose favor the decision-maker would 
like to have (or whose wrath the decision-maker would like to 
avoid). 
This could include, for re-appointable decision-makers, those 
responsible for reappointment; for civil servants, those 
responsible for pay and promotion decisions; for elected officials 
(including state judges), the electorates responsible for 
                                                       
 101. On the degree to which a similar range of attitudes, values, or professional 
conventions increase the predictability of decisions, at least at a particular time and 
place, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19–20 
(1960); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 14 (1990). On the way these attitudes, values, or 
professional conventions change over time, see id. at 16–19. On the relationship between 
ideology and random case assignment in a pool of decision-makers, see Adam M. Samaha, 
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 55–57 (2009). On the 
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, see generally Howard Gillman, What’s Law 
Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision 
Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467, 485–86 (2001) (reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH & 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
 102. This includes a tremendous amount of primary conduct. Consider, as one 
example, tort law, which provides incentives for primary conduct even though—at the 
time the conduct takes place—the state, court system, judicial district, and applicable 
substantive law are often undetermined or even unknowable. 
 103. This could include groups politically influential in the present (to which 
decision-makers may currently be beholden) and groups politically influential in the past, 
from which long-serving decision-makers (such as federal judges) may have been drawn. 
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re-election (or recall) or the political parties responsible for 
determining whether a decision-maker reappears on a ballot;104 
and for nearly any decision-maker, those who could potentially 
appoint the decision-maker to higher profile or higher-paying 
positions.105 
4. Degree to Which Today’s Decision Will Affect Future 
Decisions.  The fourth factor influencing the amount of law-fact 
uncertainty on a particular issue is the degree to which a 
decision could affect future decisions.106 This could involve either 
the precedential effect of the current decision or the extent to 
which the current decision might impact the decision-makers’ 
future identity or composition. 
The precedential effect of the current decision on future 
cases constrains a decision-maker in three respects. First, it may 
limit the decision-maker’s freedom of decision in future cases 
through its formal or informal precedential effect.107 Second, it 
may restrict the freedom of lower-level decision-makers (such as 
lower courts or lower-level agency officials) in the 
decision-making hierarchy.108 Third, it may drain the 
decision-maker’s political capital, limiting its ability to depart 
from precedent in future cases.109 
                                                       
 104. Cf. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 853–55 (1985) (noting the dominant role of party selection of judicial nominees 
in Cook County, Illinois). 
 105. An important note is due here. The types of outside influence involved are not 
all improper. As one example, drafters of state constitutions would not have made judges 
face elections if they did not want them to be—at least in some broad sense—influenced 
by their prospects for re-election. This is balanced, at least in part, by the fact that an 
electoral challenger can make an election issue out of any decision that appears to have 
gone beyond the proper bounds of decision-making based on applicable facts and law. 
 106. On the forward-looking role of precedent, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (“[Although] [a]n argument from precedent seems at 
first to look backward[,] . . . in an equally if not more important way, an argument from 
precedent looks forward as well, asking us to view today’s decision as a precedent for 
tomorrow’s decisionmakers.”). 
 107. Id. at 576–79.  
 108. Id. at 576.  
 109. In discussing the role of precedent in Supreme Court decision-making, 
Frederick Schauer concludes that a strong norm of following horizontal precedent 
“appears now not to exist and . . . appears not to have existed for at least several 
generations.” Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme 
Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 397 (2007). Nevertheless, the justices write their 
opinions as if precedent did constrain them, see id. at 382 & n.4, and are subject to 
criticism (from dissenting justices and outside commentators) when they appear to 
disregard it. See, e.g., id. at 382–85 (noting extensive criticism of the Roberts Court for 
perceived failures to follow horizontal precedent). Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
U.S. Supreme Court suffers legitimacy costs even when it issues decisions that are 
perceived as substantively correct—when those decisions rely on a substantial departure 
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The degree of law-fact uncertainty on a high-profile issue 
can also be affected by the degree to which a current decision 
might influence the decision-making institution’s future identity 
or composition.110 A classic example (and one usually viewed 
today as positive)111 is the U.S. Supreme Court’s change of 
heart—in the wake of President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Court-packing plan—on the constitutionality of New Deal 
programs.112 A more recent example is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore, which effectively determined the 
outcome of the 2000 presidential election.113 Had a justice retired 
or passed away during the first term of George W. Bush’s 
presidency, President Bush’s opportunity to appoint a Supreme 
Court justice would have been a fairly direct result of the Bush v. 
Gore decision.114 Other significant examples tied less to a decision 
in a single case include the possible role of the Warren Court’s 
pro-defendant criminal procedure decisions in leading to the 
establishment of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.115 
This Part (III.C) has focused on law-fact uncertainty. It has 
suggested that law-fact uncertainty is tied to four related factors: 
the decision-maker’s competence; the range of attitudes or 
ideologies potentially held by the relevant decision-maker; the 
decision-maker’s susceptibility to outside influence; and the 
degree to which the current decision may increase or decrease 
the decision-maker’s future discretion. 
                                                       
from existing precedent. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, Foreword to FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, at vii 
(2004) (“Every teacher of constitutional law must ultimately make peace with Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954) . . . .”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1959) (strongly criticizing Brown’s 
reasoning while implying substantive agreement with the outcome). 
 110. This is apparent with respect to a limited number of high profile cases in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, but a similar phenomenon likely affects other courts (especially 
state courts chosen by election) and politically appointed agency officials (in both 
independent and non-independent agencies). 
 111. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 94, at 15. 
 112. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 113. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). On the Bush v. Gore decision, see generally 
THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. 
Epstein eds., 2001). 
 114. The chain of causation is far more attenuated with respect to the two 
nominations President George W. Bush was able to make following his 2004 re-election. 
 115. See Eric A. Posner, Casual with the Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 23, 2011), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/94516/nixons-court-kevin-mcmahon (reviewing KEVIN J. 
MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL 
CONSEQUENCES (2011)) (noting that “[Nixon] sought a justice who would support his 
anti-busing and pro-law-and-order position” and accordingly “chose Warren Burger, who 
had delivered speeches taking Nixon’s line on law-and-order”); id. (“[Nixon] wanted a 
court that would moderate the Warren Court’s opinions on busing and the rights of 
criminal defendants, and that is what he got.”). 
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To summarize, three broad types of uncertainty affect 
regulation of conduct by the legal system: legal uncertainty; 
factual uncertainty; and law-fact uncertainty. Examining the 
broad range of fact and law-fact uncertainty, however, it appears 
that the concern frequently focused on legal uncertainty may be 
overstated. Legal certainty is often desirable, but it is insufficient 
to give primary actors a solid background against which to plan. 
Factual uncertainty is pervasive, and law-fact uncertainty 
reduces the degree to which legal certainty gives parties any 
definite information about how the law will be applied to their 
conduct. The next Part focuses on the relationship between legal 
uncertainty, legal complexity, and legal form—and questions 
whether legal certainty can be realized. 
IV. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY 
This Part argues that there are fundamental limits on how 
much certainty can be achieved through the law.116 These limits 
can be illuminated by discussion of the relationship between 
legal uncertainty and legal form. Legal requirements can be 
understood as points or regions in a space with two axes117—a 
horizontal axis ranging from rules to standards and a vertical 
axis ranging from simple to complex.118  
Under this model, there are two basic ways of changing the 
degree of certainty that characterizes a particular legal 
                                                       
 116. The focus of this discussion is on uncertainty about present content of the law, 
but much of the discussion should also apply to uncertainty about past or future content 
of the law as well. 
 117. A prior article by this Author uses the term spectrum rather than axis, and 
models both spectra as extending in a potentially infinite space in each direction. 
Muchmore, supra note 21, at 180. After further discussions with a colleague, I now believe 
that this should be modified as follows. First, the rule-standard axis should be bounded at 
each end, as there do seem to be pure rules and pure standards. A pure rule would be a 
requirement that indicated “no” to any question about whether something was permitted 
or, alternatively, a requirement that indicated “yes” to any question about whether 
something was permitted. A pure standard would be something that instructed a 
decision-maker to use his or her unbounded discretion. Second, the simple-complex axis 
should be bounded at the “simple” end but extend to infinity on the “complex” side. At one 
end, with pure simplicity, no legal requirement would exist at all. With no law to 
constrain behavior, the legality of every action can be determined with no effort. 
Complexity extends to infinity because it should always be possible to make something 
more complex by adding additional specificity or creating additional, related 
requirements. It also follows that there should be a precise midpoint on the rule-standard 
axis, but no precise midpoint on the simple-complex axis. 
 118. For a detailed illustration, see Muchmore, supra note 21, at 180. This models 
the horizontal axis with rules on the left and standards on the right. It models the vertical 
axis with simple at the top, and complex at the bottom. This puts simple rules in the 
upper-left quadrant, simple standards in the upper-right quadrant, complex rules in the 
lower-left quadrant, and complex standards in the lower-right quadrant. 
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requirement. The first is moving a legal requirement between the 
“rule” and “standard” ends of the horizontal axis. This can be 
done by either amending or re-interpreting the requirement to 
fall at a different place on the horizontal axis. The second is 
moving the requirement to a new point between the “simple” and 
“complex” ends of the vertical axis. This can be done by either 
amending or re-interpreting the requirement to fall at a different 
place on the vertical axis.119 
There are limits on how much certainty can be increased by 
moving from standards to rules, or from simple to complex legal 
requirements. After a given point is reached, further movement 
in these directions can decrease, rather than increase, legal 
certainty. As developed in this Part, there are two limits on the 
degree to which making a requirement more rule-like can 
increase certainty. Those limits result from the presence of other, 
related rules120 and from the tendency of many human 
decision-makers to seek justice in an individual case.121 Likewise, 
there are two limits on the degree to which making a 
requirement more complex can increase certainty.122 Those limits 
result from the resources required to understand complex rules123 
and from the fact that each additional consideration in a 
standard provides a different ground on which a decision might 
wholly or partly be based.124 
A. Making Requirements More Rule-Like 
1. The Problem of Inconsistent Rules.  As discussed in more 
detail below, the certainty of rules is reduced to the degree that 
the choice between two or more rules leading to different 
outcomes is underdetermined.125 The more related rules there are 
                                                       
 119. On characteristics that increase or decrease the complexity of a legal 
requirement, see supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text. 
 120. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 121. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 122. For simplicity, the discussion in the following paragraphs will refer to rules and 
standards as ideal types, even though real legal requirements instead exist as a range 
between those two extremes. See supra Part II.A. 
 123. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 124. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 125. The argument in this Article does not depend on any specific claim about what 
is and is not part of the same legal requirement. For fascinating empirical work on what 
is—and is not—part of the same legal subject, see the work Michael Gilbert has done on 
single-subject rules in direct democratic elections. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, 
A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687 (2010); 
Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject 
Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (2011); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and 
the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006). 
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to apply, the more likely any given rule is to conflict with the 
other, related rules.126 
Rule systems are internally inconsistent when, on the same 
set of facts, two rules leading to two different outcomes can 
legitimately be applied.127 For example, multiple rules may 
purport to dictate the outcome of particular cases, with no 
broadly accepted meta-rule to determine which of those rules 
should be applied to a particular set of facts.128 In such a 
situation, the regulatory scheme contains multiple, similarly 
authoritative rules that would, if applied, lead to conflicting 
outcomes.129 Common illustrations of conflicting rules include 
lines of precedent in courts that rarely overrule old decisions 
(such as those in place in the U.S. Supreme Court);130 canons of 
statutory construction;131 and characterization decisions of courts 
applying the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.132 In these 
situations, uncertainty comes not from the application of any 
particular rule, but from the fact that the choice of which rule to 
                                                       
 126. Cf. Tullock, supra note 13, at 204–06 (noting the tendency of highly detailed 
legal systems to contain inconsistent requirements).  
 127. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 989. A simple example is a situation where 
mainstream right-leaning jurisprudential views can be used to justify one outcome and 
mainstream left-leaning jurisprudential views can be used to justify the opposite outcome. 
 128. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 94, at 179 (suggesting, with Justice Black’s advocacy 
of absolutes as an example, that structuring legal requirements as rules puts power in the 
hands of those in a position to choose which of various competing rules to apply to a 
particular case); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 
(1950) (suggesting that, in statutory interpretation, “there are two opposing canons on 
almost every point,” and listing twenty-eight pairs of opposing canons). 
 129. The most accessible example here is the body of precedent produced by many 
courts in the United States. As court personnel (and the rest of society) have changed over 
time, many courts have been left with lines of jurisprudence setting out competing rules. 
Even if courts did not have the option of modifying their precedent (or choosing to apply 
standards instead of rules), it would still be difficult to predict, in many situations, which 
of the competing lines of rules the relevant court would apply in the future. 
 130. Wade, supra note 9, at 196 & n.32 (citing Comm’r v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 
285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). A colleague has suggested that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to overrule older precedents explicitly does not create a 
system of conflicting rules, because it is standard doctrine that the newer case governs. I 
agree to a point. Sometimes it is sufficiently obvious an older case is no longer valid that, 
in practice, there is no real conflict with the newer case. But there are also situations 
where the Court sets out a conflicting rule in a newer case while distinguishing the old 
case on highly debatable grounds. In this situation, future Courts can pick between two 
conflicting rules without any clear meta-rule to aid in making that choice. 
 131. See Llewellyn, supra note 128, at 401–06. 
 132. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 233–35 (2d prtg. 1949) (criticizing the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws for 
providing little guidance on how courts should make the often outcome-determinative 
decision of how to characterize—assign to a legal category, such as tort or contract, 
substance or procedure, etc.—a particular legal issue). 
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apply is legally underdetermined.133 And here is the irony. In this 
case, the presence of conflicting rules pushes the legal 
requirement closer to the standard end of the continuum as it 
becomes increasingly difficult to know ex ante which of the 
various competing “rules” to apply. 
2. The Pressure for Justice in the Individual Case.  As a 
requirement becomes more rule-like, it becomes increasingly 
likely that a human decision-maker will seek to evade the 
requirement to avoid an outcome the decision-maker believes to 
be unjust. The possibility that this will happen creates some 
(though perhaps a low) level of uncertainty. Once a given rule 
has been evaded on multiple occasions, however, future primary 
actors face a situation increasingly similar to one with multiple, 
conflicting rules.134 
B. Adding Complexity 
1. To Rules.  Up to a point, adding complexity to rules can 
increase legal certainty by specifying predetermined outcomes in 
a greater range of fact situations. But adding complexity to rules 
reduces legal certainty in at least two situations.135 
First, it reduces legal certainty to the extent a 
decision-maker lacks the capacity to understand the more 
complex rule (either in terms of mental capacity, resources, or 
time available).136 For a system of rules, complexity begins to 
decrease certainty when the rule-based system becomes so 
complex that it is difficult for a decision-maker to determine how 
rules interact to govern the primary actor’s conduct. This effect is 
                                                       
 133. This is the case because rules license decision-makers to reach decisions that do 
not require any justification beyond—“this is the rule that applies.” The determinism of 
rules is not problematic, from a rule of law perspective, when a single rule governs the 
situation at issue. However, it is problematic when decision-makers are faced with two 
similarly authoritative rules that, if applied, generate conflicting outcomes. 
 134. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 986 (“[O]nce it is decided that a single exception 
will be allowed, it is always open, in principle, to decide that another exception should be 
made too.”). 
 135. Of course, when a rule or rule system is not yet overly complex, adding 
complexity can increase certainty—up to a point. 
 136. Legal requirements are frequently applied not by the stereotypical federal judge 
assisted by law clerks, but by busy bureaucrats (who may not have any formal legal 
training) or overworked state trial judges (who may have a caseload so heavy that they 
are rarely able to conduct any legal research before ruling on an issue). 
  On the idea that increasingly detailed legal requirements can reduce, rather 
than increase, certainty, see Endicott, supra note 13, at 383; Schuck, supra note 34, at 12, 
18–19; Stevenson, supra note 34, at 1160. In speaking about the legal system generally, 
Harry Wellington observed: “In our system the law is much too complex to be very clear 
even to specialists, and almost surely must remain so.” WELLINGTON, supra note 101, at 6.  
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similar to a situation involving multiple, conflicting rules, but is 
caused by complexity within one requirement rather than 
complexity across multiple, related requirements. 
Second, complexity reduces legal certainty to the extent that 
a decision-maker determines it is not worth the trouble to 
understand the rule’s complexity. The difference here is that the 
reduced certainty comes not from limits on the decision-maker’s 
capacity, but from the decision-maker’s cost-benefit 
calculation.137 
In either case, the certainty of the legal requirement is 
reduced to the degree that the choice between two or more legal 
requirements (leading to different outcomes) is underdetermined. 
For example, there is relatively little uncertainty about the 
technical meaning of a simple rule such as “[speed] limit of 55 
miles per hour.”138 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the U.S. 
tax code is a notoriously complex system primarily composed of 
purportedly certain rules.139 Despite seeking to specify outcomes 
in advance, the various statutes, regulations, and interpretive 
documents can make it difficult for a decision-maker to 
determine the precise tax implications of an individual 
transaction or event. In other words, decision-makers applying 
simple rules will be less error-prone than those applying complex 
ones.140 
2. To Standards.  As with rules, adding complexity to 
standards can increase certainty up to a point. For standards, the 
type of complexity that is likely to decrease their certainty is the 
presence of a large number of distinct factors that must be 
considered in the analysis. As the effect of complexity varies for 
different actors, this number will vary from situation to 
                                                       
 137. See Kaplow, supra note 34, at 151, 161. 
 138. Note that uncertainty about the technical meaning of a legal requirement is 
different from uncertainty about whether a technical violation (say, driving 56, 60, or 65 
mph rather than 55 mph) will be enforced. On the possibility that legal requirements may 
at times be intended to force compliance with a standard lower than that actually set out 
in the rule itself (such as a 55 mph speed limit enforced only when drivers exceed it by 20 
mph), see Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 VA. L. REV. 2185, 2193 (2015). For a 
suggestion that a speed limit sign is a “rather misleading advertisement” of the content of 
the law, see Tullock, supra note 13, at 206. 
 139. Like any system of rules, it has some embedded standards. See Muchmore, 
supra note 21, at 178 & n.17 (noting existence of the standard-like economic loss doctrine 
in largely rule-based tax law). 
 140. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 31 (2001) (citing the tax code as an example of a 
situation where “the presence of a lot of specific rules . . . create[s] indeterminacy about 
what ought to be done even if the individual rules are quite specific”). 
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situation.141 However, it seems likely that moving from one factor 
to two or three factors will at times increase legal certainty. 
Conversely, moving from two-to-three factors to ten-to-twelve 
factors will often decrease legal certainty.142 
Once multiple factors are relevant, the decision-maker is 
faced with a situation that presents some (but not all) of the 
same problems as a situation involving multiple inconsistent 
rules. This is not because it is impossible to know in advance 
what the decision-maker will do—that is also true (at least in 
borderline cases) with simple standards. It is instead because the 
presence of multiple factors allows the decision-maker to choose 
which of the multiple factors to privilege in the balancing 
process. This results in a range of realistically possible outcomes 
that is likely larger than would be present with a single-factor 
standard.143 
Classic examples of legal requirements that at least verbally 
are structured as simple standards include: the various 
“reasonable person” and “reasonableness” tests;144 the “clear and 
                                                       
 141. See supra Part II.C. 
 142. This may derive in part from basic limits on human capacity to process 
information. The classic article is George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or 
Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 
81 (1956), reprinted in 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 348 (1994) (suggesting that humans can 
typically identify around seven different magnitudes of any “unidimensional stimulus 
variable”). For a discussion of the significance of Miller’s observations for legal 
decision-making, see CLERMONT, supra note 100, at 62–66. 
 143. William Eskridge has made a similar point with respect to legislative history, 
which “opens up the judicial mind to possibilities that might not have occurred to the 
judge.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM 
L. REV. 531, 562 (2013) (book review). Eskridge refers to this as the “hermeneutical value 
of legislative history.” Id. (emphasis omitted). This is also related to the literature 
questioning Ronald Dworkin’s chain-novel theory of judicial precedent. Compare Dworkin, 
supra note 61, at 228–38 (setting out chain-novel theory that judicial discretion decreases 
as precedent increases), with Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing 
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156, 
1204 (2005) (concluding, based on empirical analysis of civil cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
that judicial discretion begins high in cases of first impression, decreases up to a point as 
precedent accumulates, then begins to increase again—likely because a sufficiently large 
number of precedents gives judges the ability to pick and choose which of multiple 
contradictory precedents to rely on). However, an early-stage working paper by Adam 
Samaha suggests that—under certain assumptions—an increase in the number of 
available sources reduces, rather than increases, judicial discretion. See Adam Samaha, 
Looking over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion? (draft on file 
with author). 
 144. These tests, of course, are only “simple” standards when they do not include a 
sub-test requiring courts to consider or balance specific, additional factors. See EPSTEIN, 
supra note 22, at 160 (discussing complexity of case law on “just cause” requirement in 
employment law). 
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convincing evidence”145 standard in certain civil cases;146 the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal law;147 the 
“unconscionability” exception in contract and sales law;148 and 
the “unreasonable search”149 prohibition and “probable cause” 
requirement in criminal procedure.150 
The paradigmatic example of a complex standard is a 
multifactor balancing test.151 A balancing test can be either 
exhaustive (specifying all factors that can be considered)152 or 
non-exhaustive (specifying that factors other than the ones listed 
can also be considered).153 The balancing test can specify relative 
weights for the individual factors or can allow the decision-maker 
to give each factor the weight he or she deems appropriate. 
In other words, policy-driven decisions may be more common 
when decision-makers are asked to apply complex standards 
such as non-exhaustive, multifactor balancing tests instead of 
                                                       
 145. See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT § 1.11 (Comm’n on Model Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit 2015) 
(explaining “[c]lear and convincing evidence”). 
 146. I do not include the normal, “preponderance of the evidence” requirement in 
civil cases here because that requirement is quite certain in the abstract. It requires a 
judge or jury to find in favor of a plaintiff so long there is ever-so-slightly more than a 50% 
probability favoring the plaintiff. See, e.g., id. § 1.10 (explaining preponderance of the 
evidence). This is still a standard rather than a rule, as it operates ex post rather than ex 
ante. However, the uncertainty here is not “legal uncertainty,” as the legal requirement is 
precise. It is, instead, uncertainty about the application of law to fact. See infra Part III.C. 
By contrast, both “clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” are 
legally uncertain, as they are deliberately structured to avoid providing a precise quantity 
or percentage likelihood that a decision-maker must calculate.  
  On the possibility that some amount of legal uncertainty remains even in the 
preponderance of the evidence standard, see CLERMONT, supra note 100, at 210–11,  
275–78.  
 147. See, e.g., MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT § 3.06 (Comm’n on Model Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit 
2015) (explaining proof beyond a reasonable doubt). On the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 148. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (providing that a 
court can refuse to enforce all or part of a contract on the ground of unconscionability); see 
also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (explaining unconscionability test). 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Muchmore, supra note 21. 
 152. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 964 (using as an example the Emergency 
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, which mandated that the agency “provide for” nine 
diverse factors “to the maximum extent practicable” and “added that each of the nine 
factors is equally important” (citing Act of Nov. 27, 1973, § 4(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 
Stat. 627, 629–30)). 
 153. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 US 579, 593 (1993) 
(prominently explicating four or five factors for evaluating the admissibility of scientific 
evidence but noting that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume 
to set out a definitive checklist or test”).  
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simple, single-factor standards. Similarly, from a behavioral 
economic perspective, something similar to the availability 
heuristic might make it more likely that a decision-maker would 
rely on a particular, otherwise-unlikely factor when it is listed in 
a multifactor test than if the decision-maker is presented with a 
straightforward single-factor test.154 
For example, the basic torts choice-of-law provision of the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws directs courts to apply 
the law of the state that has “the most significant relationship to 
the occurrence and the parties” with respect to the particular 
issue in question.155 In making that determination, courts are to 
consider four physical locations, “evaluat[ing] [them] according to 
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue”: 
the “place where the injury occurred,” “the place where the 
conduct causing the injury occurred,” “the domicil[e], residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 
parties,” and “the place where the relationship, if any, between 
the parties is centered.”156 This works well if all four factors point 
to the same state—but if that is the case, the court does not have 
a conflict-of-laws problem and simply applies the law of the only 
relevant state. When the different factors point in different 
directions, the Restatement may legitimize greater reliance on 
one of these factors than courts might have been willing to use 
had the requirement simply been to apply the law of the place 
with the “most significant relationship” to the case as a whole.157 
Of course, the point at which additional complexity begins to 
decrease certainty is an empirical question. Barton Beebe has 
                                                       
 154. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the availability heuristic (which is 
generally taken as the tendency to consider memorable or emotionally salient outcomes to 
be more likely than they in fact are) is directly applicable here. For a classic work on the 
availability heuristic, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A 
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 163–65 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 156. Id. § 145(2). 
 157. It isn’t even this simple. Section 145(1) doesn’t just point to “the most significant 
relationship” to the case as a whole. It directs court to look to “the most significant 
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.” Id. 
§ 145(1). The occurrence (territory) and the parties (nationality/residence/domicile) are 
two diametrically opposed bases on which conflict-of-law regimes can be based. See LEA 
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS § 1.13 (1995). 
Moreover, section 6 is an even broader multifactor balancing test, including factors such 
as “the needs of the interstate and international systems” and “the basic policies 
underlying the particular field of law.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 6(2)(a), (e). Finally, it is not at all clear whether one begins by applying section 145 and 
then moves to section 6, or vice-versa (beginning with section 6 and moving to section 
145). 
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done pioneering empirical analysis of the way judges actually 
apply two doctrinally important multifactor tests in intellectual 
property law: the test for trademark infringement and the test 
for copyright fair use.158 
Beebe’s trademark infringement results suggest that judges 
applying multifactor tests tend to rely on “a limited number of 
core factors” to determine the outcome of complex multifactor 
tests.159 In doing so, they appear to employ a “core attributes 
heuristic,” which leads them to “stop acquiring and analyzing 
information once the last in their set of most important, 
determinant attributes has been acquired and analyzed.”160 Once 
judges have determined the test outcome based on these core 
factors, they tend to “stampede”161 the other factors to 
“subsequently fall in line to support that outcome.”162 
Beebe’s copyright fair use results suggest that conventional 
academic and judicial perceptions may be poor predictors of how 
particular multifactor tests operate in practice.163 In particular, 
on-the-ground application of multifactor tests may diverge 
substantially from what is suggested by a review of traditional 
“leading cases” in the field.164 
Overall, adding complexity to standards does the same thing 
it does for rules. Up to a point, complexity increases legal 
certainty; past that point, it decreases legal certainty. 
Thus, there are limits on how much legal certainty can be 
increased by either making a requirement more rule-like or 
making a requirement more complex. At some point, further 
movement in these directions can decrease, rather than increase, 
legal certainty. 
                                                       
 158. The first is the multifactor test for likelihood of confusion in trademark law. 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, Trademark Infringement]. The second is 
the multifactor test for fair use in copyright law. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (2008) 
[hereinafter Beebe, Copyright Fair Use]. 
 159. Beebe, Trademark Infringement, supra note 158, at 1600. 
 160. Id. at 1602. 
 161. Id. at 1600. 
 162. Id. at 1615. 
 163. Beebe, Copyright Fair Use, supra note 158, at 552–54. Beebe’s results also 
suggest an additional layer of complexity for multifactor tests. To the extent conventional 
perceptions do not reliably predict how multifactor tests operate in practice, empirical 
analysis beyond the capabilities of most practicing lawyers may be necessary to determine 
the effective content of the law. In other words, even if some multifactor tests turn on a 
relatively small number of core factors, the fact that empirical analysis is required to 
identify those core factors itself increases the complexity of the relevant legal 
requirement.  
 164. Id. at 555.  
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V. THE ROLE OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN REGULATORY DESIGN 
Up to now, the Article has focused on establishing two 
primary points. First, legal uncertainty is a smaller practical 
problem than it is often thought to be because it is dwarfed by 
other types of uncertainty. Second, interaction between legal 
certainty and legal complexity limits the amount of legal 
certainty that can be achieved. 
The framework developed to establish those primary points 
suggests further possibilities for analyzing the role of legal 
uncertainty in regulatory design. This Part will advance four 
tentative propositions for further research.165 A thorough 
examination of each of them is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but they suggest the value of a solid analytical framework for 
analyzing the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. 
The four propositions are: (1) pockets of legal uncertainty are 
often a desirable characteristic of regulatory systems; (2) large 
swings over time between high levels of certainty and 
uncertainty are less desirable than a consistent, moderate level 
of legal uncertainty; (3) arguments for legal certainty are rarely 
distributionally neutral and are often window dressing for what 
are fundamentally distributional arguments; and (4) uncertainty 
about the content of future legal requirements is qualitatively 
different from uncertainty about the application of existing legal 
requirements. 
A. Pockets of Legal Uncertainty 
The first proposition is that pockets of uncertainty are 
desirable in many, and perhaps most, regulatory systems. There 
are several reasons for this. There are times when a seemingly 
uncertain legal requirement may in fact be more certain in 
practice than a seemingly precise one.166 Requirements setting a 
precise limit on socially undesirable behavior can encourage 
primary actors to come as close to that limit as possible.167 And, 
                                                       
 165. To which the Author of this Article hopes to contribute soon. 
 166. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 609 (“At least in some instances, there is a 
great deal more clarity and certainty about a mud rule than a crystal one. This view is 
reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code, where a muddy term like ‘commercial 
reasonableness’ is regarded as a standard that is more predictable to business people than 
such arcana as the mailbox rule of offer and acceptance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 167. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 9, at 179–80; see also Kennedy, supra 
note 21, at 1695–96 (“Rules, on the other hand, allow the proverbial ‘bad man’ to ‘walk the 
line,’ that is, to take conscious advantage of under-inclusion to perpetrate fraud with 
impunity.”). However, this can also cut the other direction, especially if the regulatory 
goal is an optimal level of the behavior rather than a minimal politically achievable level. 
Uncertain legal requirements can in some circumstances encourage either under- or 
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as described above, efforts to eliminate uncertainty by adding 
additional specificity can simply result in complex, uncertain 
requirements.168 
Together, this means that promulgating certain 
requirements in all circumstances would result in a deadweight 
social loss. It is easy to see why this can happen. Promulgating a 
legal requirement, whether by the Legislative, Executive, or 
Judicial Branch, consumes resources that will not be usable 
elsewhere.169 Those involved in developing regulatory systems 
have limited factual information about the present and even 
more limited factual information about the future. Simple 
requirements may require less effort than complex requirements, 
but they will nearly always be over- or under-inclusive.170 More 
complex requirements may be less over- or under-inclusive, but 
will require a correspondingly larger investment of resources to 
develop. 
Even with a substantial investment of resources, regulators 
will still have limited factual information about relevant current 
and future states of the world. It is highly unlikely that they will 
be able to anticipate all future situations to which the regulatory 
system they are developing will be applied. Without this 
predictive ability, it may be wasteful to invest the resources 
necessary to develop a system of certain, ex ante rules. 
Instead, those involved in regulation should seek to 
determine which aspects of the regulatory system should be 
governed by certain legal requirements and which aspects should 
be governed by uncertain requirements. Once the appropriate 
locations for uncertainty have been identified, regulators should 
focus on the manner in which the legal requirement is 
structured171 and the individual or entity to whom the duty to 
interpret and apply the uncertain requirement is delegated.172 
                                                       
over-compliance. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984). 
 168. See supra Part IV.B. 
 169. See generally Kaplow, supra note 21. 
 170. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 31–34, 50; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 990. 
 171. See supra Part IV (discussing simple rules, complex rules, simple standards, 
and complex standards). 
 172. On the incentive structures involved in decisions to delegate authority, see 
generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORHAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999). For an 
analysis of potential problems involved in delegating enforcement authority in a specific 
field (imported-food safety), see Muchmore, supra note 3, at 397–416.  
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B. Taming the Certainty-Uncertainty Cycle 
The second proposition is that large swings over time 
between high levels of certainty and uncertainty are less 
desirable than a consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty. 
Many legal theorists have detected a cycle between rules and 
standards, rigidity and flexibility.173 This is itself a source of legal 
uncertainty, either because the content of legal requirements are 
changed repeatedly, or because legal requirements are repeatedly 
reinterpreted to meet the mood of the time.174 Careful attention 
to where legal uncertainty exists in a particular regulatory 
scheme can help minimize the frequency and severity of these 
swings. Moderate levels of legal uncertainty, placed 
appropriately, can perhaps contribute to overall stability and 
predictability. 
C. Disguised Distributional Arguments 
The third proposition is that arguments for legal certainty 
are rarely distributionally neutral and are often window dressing 
for what are fundamentally distributional arguments.175 Once 
baselines are taken into account, arguments for legal certainty 
are rarely distributionally neutral.176 Pareto superior changes are 
rare; replacing an uncertain legal requirement with a certain 
legal requirement ordinarily will harm at least one person or 
group.177 This group consists of those who would have benefited 
from the decision-maker’s discretion under the existing standard, 
but do not qualify for similar beneficial treatment under the new, 
more certain legal requirement. Similarly, it will benefit at least 
one group—those who would not have benefited from the 
decision-maker’s discretion under the existing standard, but who 
will benefit from the arbitrary cutoff inherent in a certain legal 
requirement. 
Additionally, lawyers, regulatory compliance specialists, 
accountants, and everyone else who earns money providing 
advice on compliance with legal requirements will feel 
                                                       
 173. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 174. On changes in law to meet the overall mood of the time, see GILMORE, supra 
note 94, at 68–70.  
 175. I develop this point further in a separate paper focused on the regulation of civil 
litigation.  
 176. On the concept of baselines, see generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 198–206 (2007).  
 177. Unless it is truly a Pareto superior change, which is highly unlikely in the real 
world. And, of course, the converse is also true—replacing a certain legal requirement 
with an uncertain legal requirement will necessarily harm at least one person or group. 
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distributional effects from increases or decreases in legal 
certainty. However, at least a portion of those distributional 
effects is unrelated to the distributional impact created by the 
substantive law itself. Generally speaking, these professionals 
will be harmed by increases in the simplicity of legal 
requirements and will benefit from increases in their 
complexity.178 
This suggests that regulatory designers179 should be 
skeptical of those who claim that there is a need for certainty in a 
particular legal requirement.180 It is likely that there are many 
areas of law where more certain legal requirements would 
increase overall social welfare. Many proposals to increase legal 
certainty will be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and some may even 
approach Pareto superiority.181 But other proposals to increase 
certainty are likely to reduce overall social welfare by directing 
resources to a small group of distributional winners. Moreover, it 
is likely that arguments for increased certainty will be made 
least forcefully in situations where the benefits of certainty are 
broadly dispersed. This is because lobbying182 for legal certainty 
is not costless, and in situations with widely dispersed 
certainty-related benefits, the individual or entity incurring the 
lobbying costs only captures a small portion of the benefits.183 
Instead, an individual or entity investing resources to lobby for 
certainty is likely to structure the proposed legal requirement in 
such a way that it has at least sufficient distributional benefits to 
cover the related lobbying costs. 
Distributional decisions can be implemented through rules 
or standards and can involve simple or complex requirements. 
The degree to which the relevant legal requirements are certain 
will influence primary behavior, but often to a lesser degree than 
                                                       
 178. Cf. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 21, at 270–71; Wade, supra note 9, at 194 
(noting that, in places where law was “predetermined and exactly predictable . . . there 
would be no lawsuits, and consequently . . . no lawyers”).  
 179. On the “structural differences” between the perspectives on rules of those who 
impose rules and those who are subject to them, see Frederick Schauer, Imposing Rules, 
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 85, 85–86 (2005).  
 180. On the possibility that those seeking a regulatory change are often seeking a 
redistribution of public resources toward themselves, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4 (1971).  
 181. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 1.2 (8th 
ed. 2011) (explaining Pareto superiority). 
 182. In this context, “lobbying” denotes any effort to influence the content of a legal 
requirement. This could include academic articles, public relations efforts, and other 
activities that would not formally qualify as lobbying under U.S. federal or state law. 
 183. On industry’s tendency to lobby primarily for regulatory changes with 
concentrated (rather than widely dispersed) distributional benefits, see Stigler, supra 
note 180, at 4–5.  
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their distributional implications. For example, consider two 
classic distributional issues in tort law. One is phrased in the 
form of rules, the other mostly in the form of standards. 
Let’s start with standard-like requirements. A choice 
between negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct as a 
basis for liability is a decision among legal requirements 
structured as standards. But the standard chosen carries major 
distributional consequences for potential tortfeasors and 
potential tort victims. Of the three standards of care, a willful 
misconduct standard imposes the lowest costs on potential 
tortfeasors. In turn, a gross negligence standard imposes fewer 
costs on potential tortfeasors than a negligence standard. This is 
the case even though all are structured as standard-like 
requirements rather than rule-like requirements.184 And 
potential tortfeasors will care far more about the level of care 
they are required to exercise than about whether it is structured 
as a rule or a standard.185 
Of course, I have left off an important alternative to 
negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct—strict 
liability. Strict liability, however, is a rule rather than a 
standard, at least at the liability phase.186 But its rule-like 
nature is not why a primary actor might prefer it over the other 
three standards. What is important to most primary actors is the 
distributional decision strict liability entails. Strict liability is 
more favorable to potential victims (and less favorable to 
potential tortfeasors) than each of the other three standards of 
care.187 
Now consider a choice between two rule-like requirements of 
tort law with major distributional consequences: contributory 
and comparative negligence. Both are rule-like in their classic 
                                                       
 184. Willful misconduct is probably more rule-like than negligence or gross 
negligence, especially if one adopts an objective (rather than subjective) approach to 
willfulness. But, since it is an intent requirement and we do not currently have ways of 
precisely measuring an individual’s intent, it still seems closer to the standard end than 
the rule end of the rule-standard continuum. 
 185. At least if they are sufficiently sophisticated or acting at a large enough scale to 
consider the risk of lawsuits in making decisions about the standard of care to exercise, 
how much insurance to purchase, or how much to set aside as self-insurance. 
 186. It is likely more standard-like at the damages phase, but that should not affect 
this analysis. 
 187. Assuming, of course, that the damages a tortfeasor must pay for any accident 
are equal among the three models. In real life, the political bargain is often different. 
Potential tortfeasors at times agree to support a compromise—such as that involved in 
workers compensation schemes—that substitute strict liability for negligence, but in turn 
provide for a lower level of damages than were available under the previous negligence 
regime. 
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form. Under a contributory negligence regime, a tort victim 
cannot recover anything if his or her own negligence contributed 
in any way to the injury.188 Under a comparative negligence 
regime, a tort victim’s recovery is reduced by the degree to which 
his or her own negligence contributed to the injury.189 Both are 
equally rule-like, and it is possible to imagine various rule-like 
alternatives in between the two.190 Again, a primary actor’s 
preferences between these two regimes will be based on their 
distributional consequences, not on the (roughly equal) level of 
legal certainty they display. 
D. Present and Future Legal Requirements 
The fourth proposition is that uncertainty about the content 
of future legal requirements is qualitatively different from 
uncertainty about the application of existing legal requirements. 
Predicting outcomes under an existing legal requirement 
may involve some degree of uncertainty, in the general sense 
that the term is used in this Article. However, it is a process that 
comes closer to Frank Knight’s concept of quantifiable Knightian 
Risk rather than non-quantifiable Knightian Uncertainty.191 It is 
also a fundamental part of what lawyers are trained to do—Karl 
Llewellyn called it the lawyer’s “hunching-power.”192 Generally 
speaking, predicting outcomes under current legal requirements 
involves choosing among a fairly limited range results reasonably 
possible under current law.193 
                                                       
 188. In other words, if the injury is 20% the fault of the victim, and 80% the fault of 
the tortfeasor, the victim recovers nothing. 
 189. In other words, if the injury is 20% the fault of the victim, and 80% the fault of 
the tortfeasor, the victim recovers 80% of his or her damages. 
 190. For example, one could provide that the victim recovers nothing if the injury is 
more than 50% due to the victim’s negligence, but recovers proportionally if the victim’s 
negligence contributed less than 50% to the injury. And this of course suggests 
additional—and perhaps increasingly complex—rule-like variations. 
 191.  For Frank Knight’s concepts of “risk” and “uncertainty,” see supra note 1. In 
other words, with existing law (and existing legal institutions) as a background, 
experienced lawyers are often able to give a rough numerical estimate of the likely case 
outcome.  
 192. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 113 (1930) (exhorting law 
students to “school[] . . . your hunching-power as to the outcome of a case, as to the way a 
court will jump”); see also id. (“Your client pays you to hunch right. Of course, he pays you 
too, if you hunch wrong. Once.”). 
 193. The degree of certainty involved in a standard-like legal requirement depends 
on the identity of the individual (or groups of individuals) to whom application of the 
standard is delegated. To the extent decision-makers share similar backgrounds and 
policy views (and are insulated from corrupting influences), the range of likely outcomes 
is relatively limited. In such a situation, the outcome in a particular fact situation may be 
fairly predictable even when the legal requirement is uncertain. (The converse also 
applies.) 
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Predicting the content of future legal requirements of course 
involves some quantifiable Knightian Risk. But it also involves a 
far greater degree of Knightian Uncertainty than predicting 
outcomes under existing requirements. Thinking purely in terms 
of formal law, the content of future legal requirements turns on 
election results, the life span of particular office holders, and the 
bargaining that takes place among different public and private 
actors. And each of these depends on all of the events that take 
place in the world—from the discovery of DNA to the 
development of atomic weaponry to the capture of an individual 
terrorist. These inputs into the law-making process are things 
that lawyers and their clients are poorly equipped to predict in 
anything beyond the very short term. They are perhaps closer to 
the expertise of political scientists, macro-economists, and 
cutting-edge scientists—but none of these groups have proved 
particularly successful in long-term prediction either. 
Uncertainty about future legal requirements impacts 
long-range planning by both public and private entities. And 
uncertainty about future law is more problematic, in terms of 
long-range planning, than uncertainty about present law. This is 
more so when the uncertainty is about—as it often is—the 
distributional decisions that the future law will make. 
This Part has set out four tentative propositions about the 
role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design. Those four 
propositions are reviewed at the end of the concluding Part 
below. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the role of legal uncertainty in 
regulatory design. First, it highlighted the relationship between 
legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and law-fact uncertainty. 
It demonstrated that factual uncertainty and law-fact 
uncertainty play a major role in the decision-making of primary 
actors. Accordingly, even complete legal certainty cannot come 
close to eliminating the uncertainty faced by primary actors in 
their interactions with the law. 
Second, the Article focused on legal uncertainty, viewing it 
from two perspectives: legal form (the range from rules to 
standards) and legal complexity (the range from simple to 
complex). It demonstrated that there are limits to the degree of 
legal certainty that can be obtained by making legal 
requirements either more rule-like or more complex. These are 
limits of internal consistency; the pressure for justice in the 
individual case, and the tendency of additional complexity—past 
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a certain point—decrease, rather than increase, the certainty of 
legal requirements. 
Third, the Article set out four propositions, for further 
research, arising out of the framework developed here: 
(1) pockets of legal uncertainty are often a desirable 
characteristic in regulatory systems; (2) large swings over time 
between high levels of certainty and uncertainty are less 
desirable than a consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty; 
(3) arguments for legal certainty are often disguised 
distributional arguments; and (4) uncertainty about the content 
of future legal requirements is qualitatively different from 
uncertainty about the application of existing legal requirements. 
 
